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This Article uses a hand-collected dataset of venture capitol partnership agreements to
study venture capitalist (VC) compensation. Several new findings emerge, First, VC compen-
sation consists of three element4 not two (management fee and carried interest), as common-
ly believed The third element is the value-of-distribution rules that specify when during the
fund's life VCs receive distributions These rules often generate an interest-free loan to VCs
from limited partner A shift from the most popular distribution rule to the second-most
popular rule can affect VC compensation as much as or more than common variations in
management fee (from 2 percent to 2.5 percent of committed capital) or carried interest
(from 20 percent to 25 percent of fund profit). Second, VC compensation is often more com-
plex and manipulable than it could have been. However, more complex management-fee
provisions predict lower total compensation, thu4 complexity is not used to camouflage high
pay. Third, common proxies for VC quality predict higher levels of the more transparent
forms of VC compensation (carried interest and management fee) but do not predict the
levels of opaque compensation (interest-free loan, as determined by distribution rules).
Fourth, long-term VC performance predicts fund size (which in turn predicts VC pay, con-
trolling for fund size), but recent performance does not predict changes in fund size Finally,
VC compensation is less performance-based than commonly believed- for vintage years
between 1986 and 1997 (most recent years for fully liquidated funds), about half of total VC
compensation comes from the nonrisky management fee On average, a 1 percent increase in
fund returns predicts a 0.47percent increase in total VC compensation; this pay-performance
elasticity is similar to that of public company CEOs during the same years:
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INTRODUCTION
A large body of theoretical and empirical studies concentrates on
the relationship between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs
who run young companies, yet very little is written on the relationship
between VCs and investors in venture funds. That is, there is a wealth
of knowledge on how the venture capital industry creates its product
(young companies), but not on how it governs itself or pays its own
entrepreneurs -venture capitalists.
In this Article, I examine the compensation of VCs. How VCs are
paid is an important topic in its own right, especially because, as this
Article demonstrates, an important part of their compensation is so
opaque that it has largely escaped academic notice.
VC compensation practices also can inform our views of execu-
tive compensation in public companies. Executive compensation, par-
ticularly its opaqueness and low pay-performance sensitivity, has been
the subject of much recent scholarship. One popular view is that ex-
ecutive compensation arrangements reflect legal and institutional bar-
riers to direct shareholder participation in negotiating executive pay.2
The question then arises: how do compensation arrangements look
where investors can directly negotiate executive pay?
The study of VC compensation may present a unique opportunity
to test hypotheses about executive pay. Unlike shareholders of public
corporations, who must rely on boards to determine executive pay,
venture fund investors negotiate compensation terms directly with ven-
ture capitalists at the time they sign limited partnership agreements.
Venture fund investors are sophisticated and well counseled; due to
securities laws restrictions, they are almost exclusively institutions and
1 For surveys on this topic, see generally John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, and David F.
Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 Econ Policy Rev 27 (2003)
(synthesizing prior research on equity-based compensation, including a discussion of how com-
pensation is used to align incentives, how equity incentives are measured, when such compensa-
tion is deployed, and why researchers have argued it ought to be effective); John M. Abowd and
David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering, 13 J Econ Pers-
pectives 145 (1999) (explaining recent advances in economics literature on executive compensa-
tion); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds, 3B
Handbook of Labor Economics 2485 (Elsevier 1999) (describing executive incentive contracts
and surveying empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation).
2 For a summary of the recent literature taking this view, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk and
Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation As an Agency Problem, 17 J Econ Perspectives 71, 72
(2003) (arguing that the current use of executive compensation to align the incentives of manag-
ers with those of shareholders may not be effective since the process by which executive com-
pensation is set is burdened by the very agency problems equity-based compensation attempts to
alleviate). See also generally Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 30 J Corp L 647 (2005) (arguing that flawed compensation agreements
are widespread and problematic and suggesting reforms for greater transparency).
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wealthy individuals. In addition, VC compensation is relatively stan-
dardized, at least in its basic structure, which makes it possible to
compare terms across multiple funds. This is harder to do when study-
ing executive compensation in other industries. VC performance is
also measurable and thus amenable to cross-fund comparison in a way
that performance of executives of other firms is often not.
I use a hand-collected dataset of venture capital partnership
agreements to analyze the structure and predictors of VC compensa-
tion. I supplement the study of agreements by interviews with numer-
ous industry participants -venture capitalists, managers of institutions
that invest in venture funds, attorneys, and private investors-and iden-
tify several new findings. First, the compensation of venture capitalists is
comprised not only of management fee and carried interest, the two
elements commonly identified, but includes a third element. This addi-
tional element is the value of the interest-free loan that VCs receive
from limited partners. The amount and term of this loan are specified
through distribution rules determining when VCs receive their share of
profits. A shift from the most popular distribution rule to the second-
most popular rule can affect VC compensation as much as or more than
common variations in management fee or carry percentage. Because of
this interest-free loan, VCs almost always capture a higher fraction of
funds' profits-sometimes a much higher fraction-than the nominal
carry percentage, even before we consider the management fee.
Second, VC compensation is not only more complex than is often
believed, but it is also more opaque and manipulable than it could have
been. The impact of opaqueness on total pay is ambiguous. More opaque
management-fee provisions predict lower total compensation, which is
not consistent with the view that complexity is used to camouflage high
pay. However, the interest-free loan is both opaque and highly valuable.
Third, VC compensation is substantially less performance-based
than commonly believed. For vintage years 1986 through 1997 (the
most recent years for which funds have been fully liquidated), an av-
erage VC received about half of his compensation from the manage-
ment fee, which (depending on its precise form) is either completely
or largely unaffected by fund performance. On average, a 1 percent
increase in the net present value (NPV) of a fund's returns translated
into a 0.47 percent increase in VC compensation. This pay-performance
elasticity is similar to that of CEOs of public companies during the
same years and is lower than that of CEOs of S&P 500 financial firms.
Fourth, common proxies for VC quality (past performance and capi-
tal under management) positively predict more transparent elements of
VC compensation (management fee and carry) but do not predict the
levels of opaque compensation (interest-free loan as specified in the
distribution rules).
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Fifth, fund size (a strong predictor of VC take-home pay) is
strongly and positively predicted by VC long-term past performance
and prior fund sizes; however, changes in recent performance do not
predict changes in the sizes of new funds. Finally, some management-
fee provisions have the effect of smoothing VC incomes over time.
These findings suggest that direct investor participation in the set-
ting of managerial pay may not radically change existing patterns of
executive compensation in public companies. Even though VC compen-
sation is not negotiated by uninformed, uninterested, or disloyal indi-
viduals (as directors of public companies are sometimes described), VC
compensation is still more opaque and complex than it could have been,
is higher than a calculation based on the visible components (manage-
ment fee and carry) would suggest, and has a sensitivity to perfor-
mance similar to that of public company executives. On the other
hand, in venture funds, unlike in public corporations, much of the con-
tractual complexity is not used to increase overall compensation.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the limited prior
literature, my data, and the variables I use. Part II describes the three
elements of VC compensation and presents basic descriptive statistics.
Part III analyzes predictors of VC compensation. Part IV studies the
relationship between fund size, performance, and VC compensation. In
Part V, I investigate the pay-performance sensitivity of VC compensa-
tion. Part VI analyzes the relationship between compensation complex-
ity and income smoothing.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW, DATA, AND VARIABLES
A. Literature Review
To my knowledge, there are only two other academic studies of
VC compensation. The first is a 1999 study by Paul Gompers and Josh
Lerner.3 They study a large sample of relatively old agreements, dated
from 1978 to 1992, most of them from funds raised before 1987.' They
find some variation in carry but a huge concentration at 20 percent
They also find only modest differences in management fees across
venture firms. However, as I discuss in Part II, they appear to have
miscoded management-fee rules, which use a managed-capital base!
3 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital
Partnership, 51 J Fim Econ 3 (1999).
4 See id at 27-28.
5 Id at 14.
6 Idat21-22.
7 See note 17.
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Other scholars have generally accepted the stylized fact that VC com-
pensation, relative to fund size, rarely varies from a standard level.8
The second is a contemporaneous study by Andew Metrick and
Ayako Yasuda, who study both VC and leveraged buyout funds from
1992 to 2006.' They find more variation in management-fee structures
than Gompers and Lerner,10 and also find a huge concentration in car-
ry percentage at 20 percent." Further, they report that about 40 percent
of the VC funds in their sample use a "hurdle rate," a rate of return that
must be met before carry is earned. 2 Hurdle rates are common for leve-
raged buyout funds. But I have never found them in my sample, Gom-
pers and Lerner do not mention them, and my interviewees confirmed
that in their experience, VC funds very rarely use hurdle rates. Indeed,
the leading venture capital treatise that addresses fund partnership
agreements does not even mention hurdle rates in the context of VC
compensation.3 The absence of hurdle rates from venture capital
partnership agreements has attracted academic attention before.' This
casts doubt on whether Metrick and Yasuda's sample is in fact restricted
to venture capital firms, as this term is conventionally understood.
Neither study discusses distribution rules, which emerge in my
study as a third central source of VC compensation. I am aware of
only two brief discussions of distribution rules by academics, both of
which appear in business school teaching cases."
B. Data
I use three data sources. My main dataset is hand-collected and con-
sists of partnership agreements of sixty-eight venture capital funds, raised
8 See, for example, Steven N. Kaplan and Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance:
Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows, 60 J Fin 1791, 1794 (2005) (pointing to Gompers and
Lerner's finding that VC compensation is largely uniform, and finding it "puzzling that [persis-
tently high] returns to superior skill [of some VCs] are not appropriated by the [general part-
ners] through higher fees and larger funds").
9 Andrew Metrick and Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds *4 (Work-
ing Paper, Swedish Institute for Financial Research Conference on The Economics of the Private
Equity Market, Sept 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996334 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
10 See id at 15-16.
11 Id at 10.
12 Id at 12.
13 See generally Michael J. Halloran, Lee F Benton, and Jesse Robert Lovejoy, 1 Venture
Capital and Public Offering Negotiation § 15 (Aspen Law and Business 3d ed 1996 & Supp 2008)
(describing the typical structure of management fees and expenses of venture capital partnerships).
14 See generally Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J Corp L 77 (2005)
(pointing out that venture capital partnership agreements do not use hurdle rates, while buyout
funds do, and discussing possible reasons for the difference).
15 See Steven Kaplan, Case Study, Accel Partners VII 2 (Chicago 1999), online at
http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/steven.kaplan/teaching/accel7.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009); Josh Lerner,
Case Study, A Note on Private Equity Partnership Agreements (Harvard 2000) (explaining the
structure of private equity partnerships in the form of a business school case study).
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by twenty-eight venture capital firms. All funds specialize exclusively in
venture capital, and all are US-based stand-alone limited partnerships,
rather than affiliates of other entities such as banks or corporations. All
compensation data (carry, management fee, distribution rule) and other
fund-specific contractual terms come from this dataset.
I obtain the data on fund-level non-contract-related characteristics
(fund size, vintage, location, the number of successful and failed compa-
nies, and so on) from Thomson Financial's VentureXpert database.'6 I use
only venture firms marked by VentureXpert as stand-alone limited part-
nerships and, from funds raised by those firms, I use only the funds
marked as "venture funds." My results do not change when I also restrict
the investment stage to "seed" and "early stage."
My third source is annual data on venture fund investments, distri-
butions, and profits provided to me by Sand Hill Econometrics. This is
a high-quality proprietary database containing comprehensive private-
equity data on subjects unavailable from VentureXpert and other stan-
dard commercial databases.
An important data limitation: I have data on fund sizes and on the
outcomes of portfolio investments (how many investments the fund
made and how many resulted in an IPO, a sale, or failure), but no data
on the returns of my sample funds. Thus, I have respectable proxies for
VC quality but no direct measure of performance.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. The funds in my sample were
raised between 1983 and 2005, with the mean vintage year 1997. Funds
and firms are diverse in size, age, and performance.
Limited partnership agreements are confidential documents, col-
lected principally from large institutional investors (limited partners,
or LPs) and VCs. I therefore may face a selection bias. One possibility
is that I oversample good (or bad) funds and VCs. This, however, does
not seem to be a significant problem. First, the funds in my sample are
decent representatives of funds raised in their vintage years. In Col-
umn (2) of Table 1, I present basic mean characteristics of funds in my
sample, and in Column (3), mean characteristics of all venture capital
funds in the VentureXpert database raised after 1983 (vintage year is
restricted to match the funds in my sample). The funds in my sample
are somewhat better than average (they are larger and have a higher
portion of successful companies in their portfolios), but for most va-
riables, the differences are not large.
16 VentureXpert is a large commercial database containing comprehensive information on
venture capital firms and funds, executives, and companies backed by private equity. It is widely
used in academic research in finance, law, and accounting. See, for example, Gompers and Lern-
er, 51 J Fin Econ at 14 (cited in note 3).
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Second, although the funds in my sample are slightly better than av-
erage, there is no reason to believe that the selection was driven by the
fund characteristics that I study in this Article. Most of my agreements
came from large institutional investors. Thus, my funds are better than the
average because they came from LPs who invest in better funds, not be-
cause VCs with certain compensation arrangements were more likely to
give me their agreements. Still, to the extent that (1) the funds in my
sample are above average, and (2) past performance predicts higher
compensation, I may oversample funds with above-mean compensation.
C. Variables
In my analysis, I use the following variables. All dollar-based va-
riables are measured in 2008 dollars.
Total dollars raised by the VC before this fund. This variable
represents the sum of fund sizes for all prior funds raised by the VC
(including side funds), as reported in VentureXpert. In regressions, this
variable is normalized as follows: I first calculate, for each stand-alone
venture firm in VentureXpert, the total dollars raised prior to that vin-
tage year. I then calculate the number of standard deviations by which
each of my funds differs from the mean for all funds raised in that year.
Above-median total dollars raised by the VC before this fund. This
is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if this measure is above median among
the funds in my sample and equal to 0 otherwise. It is based on the
normalized values of total dollars raised by the VC before this fund.
VC age when fund is raised. This variable is the age of a venture
firm in the year of fundraising.
Fund vintage year This variable is the year when a fund is raised.
Fund size. This variable is the total committed capital of each
venture fund, specified in the partnership agreement and cross-
checked in VentureXpert. In regressions with fund size as an indepen-
dent variable, I use normalized fund size-the number of standard
deviations by which the size of each of my funds differs from an aver-
age fund raised in the same year, as reported in VentureXpert.
Lagged fund size. This variable represents the fund size of the
VC's immediately preceding fund. It is normalized as described above
in regressions.
Fund number. This variable is the chronological number of a
fund raised by a given venture firm, specified in the partnership
agreement. In regressions, I use normalized fund number-the num-
ber of standard deviations between the chronological number of each
of my funds and the average fund number for all funds raised in the
same year, as reported in VentureXpert.
Management fee. This variable is the net present value of the cu-
mulative management fee over an assumed eleven-year fund life, as a
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percentage of committed capital. Different funds calculate fees ac-
cording to different formulas; to make fees comparable across funds, I
convert all of them to the common denominator of committed capital
(that is, fund size).
Carry. This variable is the percent of the fund's profits payable to
VCs as risky compensation.
Distribution coefficient. This variable is the ratio of carry that a
VC would receive according to the distribution rule specified in a
partnership agreement over carry that a VC would receive under the
most investor-friendly distribution rule.
Sold/Total. This ratio is the number of portfolio companies that a
venture firm "sold" (designated by VentureXpert as "IPO," "acquisi-
tion," "buyout," or "merger") in all prior funds to the total number of
portfolio companies that a VC funded in all prior funds. In regressions,
it is normalized as the number of standard deviations between the
"sold/total" value for each of my funds and the average "sold/total"
value for all VC funds formed in the same year, from VentureXpert.
IPO/Total. This ratio is the number of companies that a venture
firm took public (designated by VentureXpert as "IPO") in all prior
funds to the total number of portfolio companies that a VC funded in
all prior funds. In regressions, it is normalized as the number of stan-
dard deviations between the "IPO/total" value for each of my funds
and the average "IPO/total" values for all VC funds formed in the
same year, from VentureXpert.
Failed/Total. This ratio is the number of failed companies in a ven-
ture firm portfolio (designated by VentureXpert as "bankrupt" under
any chapter or "defunct") in all prior funds to the total number of port-
folio companies that a VC funded in all prior funds. In regressions, it is
normalized as the number of standard deviations between the
"failed/total" value for each of my funds and the average "failed/total"
value for all VC funds formed in the same year, from VentureXpert.
Above-median sold/total ratio, IPO/total ratio, and failed/total ratio.
These dummy variables equal 1 if the ratio is above the median for all
funds in my sample and equal 0 otherwise. They are based on norma-
lized sold/total, IPO/total, and failed/total values.
Base of management fee is committed capital. This dummy varia-
ble equals 1 if management fee is calculated on the basis of committed
capital and equals 0 otherwise.
Classic management fee. This dummy variable equals 1 if man-
agement fee is a constant percentage of committed capital over the
fund's life and equals 0 otherwise.
Formula for management-fee calculation changes in midstream.
This dummy variable equals 1 if formula for management-fee calcula-
tion changes at least once in the fund's "main" years, the first ten years.
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Rule 1 through Rule 8. These dummy variables equal 1 if man-
agement fee is calculated according to the formula with the corres-
ponding rule number and equal 0 otherwise. See Table 2 for rules.
Fundraising cycle of four to six years. This dummy variable equals
1 if in the past a VC firm raised new funds each four to six years (on
average) and equals 0 otherwise.
Midstream-peaking management fee. This dummy variable equals
1 when the fund's management fee peaks in middle years of fund's life
and equals 0 otherwise.
II. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF VC COMPENSATION
A. Management Fee
Investors usually pay management fees every quarter. These
payments are typically added to the investor's obligation to contribute
committed capital.
1. Types of Management-fee Formulas.
In the twenty-eight families of funds in my sample, there are nine
different formulas for calculating the management fee. Within each ven-
ture firm, these formulas are "sticky" -they sometimes change across
different funds raised by the same firm, but most of the variation is
between different firms, not between different funds raised by the
same firm.
Each formula contains two basic elements: (1) the base, and (2) the
portion of the base paid annually to the VC. The base is either commit-
ted capital, cost basis of invested capital ("managed capital"), or some
combination thereof It is very unusual to base the management fee on
the fair market value of portfolio companies managed by the fund, and
no such arrangements were found in my sample.17 The base can be con-
stant or vary over time, and the percent applied to the base also can be
either constant or vary over time. I refer to the management fee as "risk-
less" or "nonrisky" compensation because even if it is based on managed
capital and thus depends on the VC firm's investment decisions, it does
not directly depend on the profitability of these investments.
17 One top venture capital attorney put it this way in email correspondence: "Unlike hedge
funds you will never see the management fee based on [the asset value] of the [venture] fund.
One of the many reasons for this is that the assets held by these funds are illiquid and difficult to
value." Email from anonymous attorney to Kate Litvak (Jan 15, 2004). Gompers and Lerner
treat the managed-capital base as equal to the fair market value of the fund's investments, rather
than their cost basis. See Gompers and Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the US Venture
Capital Partnership, 51 J Fm Econ 3,42 (1999) (cited in note 3). This is likely to be a miscoding,
although I cannot be sure because I do not have their agreements.
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a) Classic flat fee: constant percentage of committed capital. The
VC receives a constant percentage of committed capital (that is, the
capital that investors promised to contribute to the fund) on a quar-
terly basis. Since neither the percentage nor the base changes over the
fund's life, this arrangement amounts to a flat fee, payable over time
unconditionally. Such a flat fee could have been specified in the agree-
ment as a dollar amount, rather than expressed indirectly through a
formula, but this was not the case in the agreements I reviewed, and
my interviewees confirm that this almost never happens.
b) Flexible flat fee: time-varying percentage of committed capital.
This fee is calculated as a percentage of committed capital, but the
percentage changes according to a prespecified formula over time. As
with the classic formula, the management fee here is entirely deter-
mined at the outset and thus has the same effect on VC incentives as a
flat wage would have. The only difference between the classic and the
flexible flat fee is the distribution of a preset fee over time. Since in-
vestors are sophisticated, it is hard to see the time-varying fee percen-
tage as fee obfuscation, but it might serve as a form of income smooth-
ing. I assess this possibility in Part IV.
c) Fee based entirely on managed capital. "Managed capital,"
measured as the cost basis of undistributed and unliquidated securities,
is sometimes used as a partial basis for management fee but rarely as
the sole basis (only one of my funds does so). Unlike committed capital,
which normally remains constant over time, managed capital varies
through a fund's life: it is low at first, before the fund invests in portfolio
companies; increases as the fund makes investments; and declines again
as VCs distribute proceeds to investors. Thus, in funds using a managed-
capital base, management fee peaks in the middle years, unless the per-
centage applied to the base is adjusted correspondingly (say, reduced in
middle years to flatten the fee over time), which does not occur in my
sample and, based on my interviews, virtually never happens."
The use of the managed-capital fee arrangement seems odd given
the availability of committed capital-based fees. If the purpose is to
load a larger portion of the overall riskless compensation onto certain
years, this can be done more precisely through the flexible flat fee.
Moreover, the use of managed capital carries real costs. First, the exact
size of managed capital is not known at the time of fundraising, and
thus the fee is at least somewhat uncertain. Second, when VCs receive
a fee based on invested and undistributed fund assets, they have an
incentive to speed up investment and delay distributions of these as-
sets to investors. Most agreements in my sample attempt to limit the
18 See Part VI.B.
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VC's discretion as to the size of managed capital, both during the
fund's investment period (by requiring that all called capital be
promptly invested and by setting limits on the amounts of capital cal-
lable per year'9) and in the distributions period (by requiring prompt
distributions of all proceeds from sales of portfolio companies). How-
ever, VCs can still manipulate the management fee through subopti-
mally accelerated investment schedules within the limits set by the
partnership agreement, and they can preserve their management fee
by delaying the sale of portfolio companies."
In my interviews, industry insiders suggested that managed capital
basis and flexible flat fee are attractive because it is "unfair" to pay VCs
the same compensation in middle years of a fund's life, which are the
most labor-intensive stage, as in early years when most of the fund's
capital is not yet called, or in later years when most of the fund's in-
vestments have been liquidated. This makes no sense. First, the man-
agement fee is effectively a wage paid to VCs for their labor. It is not
clear why this wage should fluctuate with the amount of work that VCs
perform in each stage. Most traditional companies pay salaried em-
ployees the same wage in busy and nonbusy times, and this is not nor-
mally viewed as "unfair." Second, it is hard to see why one manner in
which sophisticated parties allocate a fixed number of dollars over time
is "fairer" than another.
d) Fee with a switch from committed to managed capital. Here,
early-year fees are set as a percent of committed capital, while later-
year fees are set as a percent of managed capital. Because managed
capital declines in later years, this formula usually produces a gradual
reduction in the management fee. As with a fee based entirely on ma-
naged capital, this arrangement produces a less certain (and less pre-
cisely calibrated, if the goal is income smoothing) fee schedule than a
flexible flat fee, and it creates incentives for VCs to manipulate the
timing of distributions.
e) Absolute dollar amount. None of my agreements specifies a
dollar amount as a management fee; by all indications, such arrange-
ments are exceedingly rare. This may be cosmetic -a fee of 0.5 percent
of committed capital per quarter on a $500 million fund may sound
19 For more details, see Kate Litvak, Firm Governance As a Determinant of Capital Lock-in
*8-9 (University of Texas Law and Economics Research Paper No 95, Mar 2007), online at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=915004 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
20 One can imagine an explanation in which the manipulation incentives provided by a
managed-capital base offset the VC's other manipulation incentives, including those provided by
the desire to show a high internal rate of return for the current fund when raising the next fund
and those provided by distribution rules. But any offset would be rough at best, and none of my
interviewees suggested this explanation.
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better to investors than a fee of $100 million, paid $2.5 million per
quarter. But one doubts that sophisticated investors are fooled. In con-
trast, the riskless compensation paid to corporate managers is routine-
ly expressed upfront in dollars. So far, no research has explained this
difference in practices.
One could object that the management fee is different from execu-
tive compensation in that the management fee is partly used to cover
fund expenses." However, none of my agreements pegs the manage-
ment fee to the actual fund expenses that the fee covers. Moreover,
nearly all of my agreements specify expenses that limited partners have
to pay in addition to the management fee (for example, bankers' and
accountants' fees in connection with sales of portfolio companies, reim-
bursement for litigation or regulatory expenses, the fund's origination
and liquidation expenses, and so forth). The expenses covered by the
management fee are usually predictable and not volatile, consisting
mostly of fund employees' salaries, travel, and entertainment; office
rental costs; costs of preparing reports to investors; and insurance
premiums. Since venture funds already have a well-specified proce-
dure for reimbursement of actual expenses, they could have moved all
reimbursements out of the management fee and turned the manage-
ment fee into a straightforward salary provision, expressed in dollars.
This has not happened.
2. Descriptive statistics.
Management fee formulas and their frequency of use are summa-
rized in Table 2, Panel A. The most popular formula, used by eight
firms and twenty-one funds, is the "classic flat fee," followed by the
"flexible flat fee." Other methods (in order of decreasing popularity)
are: switch from committed-capital to managed-capital base in mid-
stream, accompanied (not necessarily simultaneously) by reduction
over time in the applicable percent; a constant percent applied to a
base that switches from committed to managed capital in midstream; a
percentage that increases in the first several years and declines the-
reafter, applied first to committed-capital base and later to managed-
capital base; switch from committed to managed capital with an in-
creasing percentage; a constant percentage applied to a decreasing
21 See, for example, David Toll, Private Equity Partnership Terms and Conditions 38 (Dow
Jones 3d ed 2003) (noting that, in the private equity context, "[t]he rationale [for switching from
committed capital to managed capital as a basis] is that [the VC] will incur greater expenses
during the investment period, when the team is putting the money to work. Subsequently ... [the
VC's] expenses related to this fund can be tied to the specific companies remaining in the portfo-
lio, and should therefore be reimbursed accordingly").
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fraction of committed capital; and an increasing and then declining
percentage applied to a managed-capital base.
The variety of formulas used understates the variety of manage-
ment-fee arrangements because several funds may use the same for-
mula but put different numbers into that formula. For example, among
the twenty-one funds that used the classic formula (flat percentage of
committed capital), eight funds used 2 percent, ten used 2.5 percent,
one used 2.25 percent, and two used a fee lower than 2 percent.
It should be apparent that the conventional wisdom that most ven-
ture firms charge a management fee of 2 percent of committed capital
is simply wrong.
To estimate the NPV of management fees under different ar-
rangements, I make the following assumptions: (1) the discount factor
is 7 percent, to reflect the low-risk nature of fee-based compensation;
(2) the fund life is eleven years (a one-year extension of the standard
ten-year life); (3) for funds where the fee is based on managed capital,
I assume the schedule of investments and distributions presented in
the Appendix. This schedule reflects the time that VCs need to invest
the fund's capital (hence low percentages in early years) and the dis-
tributions that they make in later years (hence low percentages in late
years). It is based on investments and distributions data for an average
fund raised in 1992, provided to me by Sand Hill Econometrics; the
results are similar if I use a typical fund schedule for a different year.
To compare management fees across funds that use different formulas
and are of different sizes, I convert each fund's NPV of the manage-
ment fee into a percentage of the fund's committed capital, regardless
of what base a fund's agreement actually used.
As Table 2, Panel A indicates, the NPV of management fees varies
widely across funds. The sixty-eight funds in my sample use twenty-nine
different values of the management fee, ranging from 3.32 percent to
20.15 percent of committed capital, with a mean of 14.14 percent and a
median of 14.30 percent. In Figure A, I present the NPV of management
fees for all funds in my sample, sorted in the ascending order of the fee.
From the Appendix, the managed-capital base is always less, and
often much less, than committed capital. Thus, unless the applicable
percentage is higher for a fee with a managed-capital base, the ma-
naged-capital base will produce a lower overall NPV. If a VC is willing
to accept a lower than usual management fee, but is concerned that
reducing the most salient feature of the fee (applicable percentage)
will send a bad signal to the market, the use of the managed-capital
basis might provide a solution. There is some evidence of such "win-
22 The model year has to be earlier than 1997 to ensure that all of the fund's activity is included.
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dow dressing" use of the managed-capital base: in my sample, a mid-
stream switch from committed to managed capital is never accompa-
nied by the compensating increase in the applicable percentage-on
the contrary, it is usually accompanied by a reduction in the applicable
percentage. This reduction would presumably look more dramatic if
the fund continued to use committed capital. Generally, the funds in
my sample that use the classic flat fee throughout the fund's life apply
the mean percentage of 2.25 percent to committed capital. For the
funds that apply a constant percentage to the base that switches from
committed to managed capital, the mean applicable percentage is 1.88
percent. It does not look like the funds are compensating for the re-
duction in base by increases in the applicable percentage.
B. Carried Interest
Carried interest is the second principal component of VC compen-
sation. It is normally measured as a flat percentage of a fund's profits
on invested capital. The carry provisions are substantially simpler than
provisions outlining management fees. Usually, carried interest does
not even occupy a separate section in partnership agreements and the
carry percentage is not directly stated; instead, it must be inferred
from reading the distribution rules, which specify how much VCs re-
ceive at each distribution.
One could easily construct a more complex carry arrangement,
where the VC's percentage of profits would change depending on
fund profitability or other conditions. For example, in many leveraged
buyout funds, the private equity firm earns carry only on returns above
a hurdle rate, such as 8 percent 2 However, as best I have been able to
determine, hurdle rates are virtually never found in venture fund
agreements, and none of my funds use them.
In the great majority of funds, the carry percentage is computed
without regard to the separate payment of the management fee. I as-
sume below that carry percentage is computed in this manner. Again,
one can imagine more complex arrangements. For example, at least
one VC firm in my sample subtracts management fee from investment
return in computing the profit on which it earns carry.
The overall result is surprising: in VC compensation, the riskless
component is complex and potentially manipulable while the risky
component is-at first blush-simple and straightforward. In many oth-
er industries, the picture is the opposite: riskless compensation is
straightforward (for example, wage), while risky compensation is com-
23 Fleischer, 31 J Corp L 77,78 (cited in note 14).
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plex (for example, bonus and stock option plans with complicated for-
mulas, or sales commissions that increase when certain benchmarks are
met). But as discussed in the next Part, the apparent simplicity of carry
is deceiving.
In addition to being apparently simpler contractually, carry varies
less across funds and venture firms. Among funds in my sample, carry
ranges from 12.5 percent of profits to 30 percent, with the mean of
22.3 percent and median of 20 percent. Figure B provides a summary.
Here, funds are sorted in the ascending order of the carry. Still, I find far
more variation than the other available studies. Only 59 percent of the
funds in my sample (forty of sixty-eight) use the "classic" 20 percent
carry. This compares to the 95 percent reported by Metrick and Yasu-
da, ' and the 81 percent reported by Gompers and Lerner.2 My results
are likely different from those reported by Gompers and Lerner be-
cause I mostly have newer funds in my sample; the difference from
Metrick and Yasuda could result either from some of their funds not
being true VC funds (which could explain their puzzling finding that
40 percent of VC funds use a hurdle rate), or from sample selection
bias, since they have funds from only a single investor.6
C. Distribution Rule
1. General principles.
While carry is simple on the surface, complexity is lurking in the
form of the distribution rules that determine when carry is paid. Each
fund invests in multiple projects; projects are liquidated at different
times throughout the fund's life; and the proceeds are distributed to
investors (usually) promptly after profits are realized. The issue then
arises: When should VCs receive their share of profits? As soon as in-
vestors get theirs? At the end of a fund's life, based on the cumulative
performance across all projects? Or is there an intermediate solution?
This need not be an important question. In a Modigliani-Miller
world," the timing of dividend payouts (conceptually equivalent to
distributions) is irrelevant to firm value. The venture fund can distri-
24 See Metrick and Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds at *10 (cited in note 9).
25 Gompers and Lerner, 51 J Fin Econ at 14 (cited in note 3).
26 For example, if their investor chooses not to invest in funds with a carry percentage
greater than 20 percent, that could explain why only one of the ninety-four VC funds in their
sample has a carry percentage above 20 percent. See Metrick and Yasuda, The Economics of
Private Equity Funds at *10 (cited in note 9).
27 See generally Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am Econ Rev 261 (1958) (presenting the theory that in
an efficient market, and in the absence of information asymmetries and costs associated with
taxes and bankruptcy, the firm's value is not related to the means by which it is financed).
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bute the VC's share of profits today, or if distribution is delayed, the
VC can borrow against his share of undistributed profits. In a decently
functioning credit market, the two arrangements could be structured
to yield the same expected value for VCs. The lower present value of a
slower distribution pattern could be offset through a change in the
carry percentage, or by charging (crediting) the VC with interest on an
early (late) distribution.
However, once information and incentive problems, transaction
costs, and taxes are taken into account, the answer changes. In inter-
views, industry insiders told me that they considered timing of distri-
butions to be important. VCs find-or at least claim-that borrowing
from outside lenders against future income is prohibitively expensive,
because they cannot credibly convey to lenders information about the
quality of their funds' portfolios. As a result, VCs instead borrow from
their own LPs through early distributions, and they care deeply about
the timing of distributions. In this way, early distributions of carry can
be used to smooth VCs' incomes.
The timing of distributions to VCs involves compromises regard-
ing the costs of outside borrowing, the credit risk faced by investors if
they allow early distributions (which might have to be repaid back into
the fund), and the need to create proper incentives for VCs, who control
the timing of distribution events. Thus, distribution schedules would
likely be complex even if VCs paid a market rate of interest on the loan
that is implicit in an early distribution that is later repaid. However, all
partnership agreements in my sample provide that no fund participant
pays any interest to any other participant for anything." Why not? After
all, interest rates, paid by the VC to the fund (or the other way around),
could compensate for the credit risk borne by investors and reduce
VCs' perverse incentives to manipulate schedules of sales.
One explanation that emerged from my conversations with prac-
titioners is that VCs usually receive a net loan from investors as a re-
sult of the timing of distributions. VCs thus may be interested in pre-
serving the current system, in which the magnitude of the loan is em-
bedded in incomprehensible clauses about distribution timing, to keep
the value of the interest-free loan at least partly hidden from inves-
tors. We may question whether sophisticated institutions can be sys-
tematically deceived in such a manner, but this speculation is not en-
tirely implausible, given that no prior academic or practitioner article
has attempted to place a dollar value on specific distribution rules.
28 A rare exception is direct traditional borrowing by the fund from an investor or a VC.
Interest on the borrowed funds, however, is a different issue from interest paid by VCs on, say,
early overpayment of profits.
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In my interviews, investors, VCs, and VC lawyers were aware of the
existence of distribution rules, but none had tried to quantify the rela-
tive value of different rules, and investors were surprised when advised
about the magnitudes I report below. One might also note that a major
investor's coding of compensation terms, which forms the basis for the
Metrick and Yasuda study,2 apparently omits distribution rules entirely.
Another notable feature is that the distribution rule is typically
independent of fund performance and broader economic conditions.
While a fund agreement could provide for a switch from one distribu-
tion to another in the midstream of a fund's life (as is common for the
management fee), this has not happened as best I can tell. Likewise,
distribution rules themselves could be linked to fund performance, but
they are not: even the (rare) rule requiring the VC to reach a certain
milestone to start receiving distributions'o does not impose follow-up
requirements; once the milestone is met, the VC receives full carry at
each distribution, regardless of subsequent performance.
2. Types of distribution methods.
In this Part, I briefly describe the distribution methods found in
my agreements. One can think of many other arrangements, and the
practitioners' literature contains other creative proposals." I list the
arrangements in increasing order of VC-friendliness.
32
a) Escrow, all interest to fund. As profits are distributed to inves-
tors throughout the fund's life, the VC's share of profits goes to an
escrow account. The interest on that account is allocated to limited
partners in proportion to their capital contributions. When the fund is
liquidated, the VC receives the principal amount from that account.
Until that time, the VC has, in effect, made an interest-free loan to
investors. This method eliminates credit risk on both sides as well as
the risk that the VC will manipulate the distribution schedule. Howev-
er, it does not allow VCs to smooth their incomes over time.
29 See Metrick and Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds at *4 (cited in note 9).
30 See discussion in Part II.C.2.
31 See generally, for example, Jonathan Axelrad and Eric Wright, Distribution Provisions in
Venture Capital Fund Agreements, Venture Capital Rev (Nov 1997), reprinted in Memorandum
from Fund Services Group, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, to Private Equity Fund Clients
(Aug 5,2001), online at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/1363214.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009).
32 For a few funds in my sample, VCs were required to repay excess carry net of the tax
that they already paid on it. One agreement went further and stated that VCs do not have to
return the amount of taxes paid but have to return the amount of future tax benefits from taking
the loss. I ignore this complication in the discussion below and in the regressions. If included in the
analysis, these net-of-tax provisions would further reinforce my main claim-that distribution rules
significantly affect and usually increase the NPV of the carry that VCs actually get-because in
most cases, VCs get to keep both the tax they paid and the future tax benefits of any loss.
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b) Return all capital contributions first ("Return First"). The VC
receives no distributions until investors get distributions equal to their
capital contributions. Once investors are paid, the VC receives carry
on amounts already distributed to investors and then receives his
share of profits at each subsequent distribution.
This method eliminates credit risk: since portfolio companies are
corporations with limited liability, the most that the fund can lose is
the amount it invested into those companies." Thus, the VC will never
receive more than his share of the fund's profits and will not have to
repay anything. The method, however, misaligns VC incentives: since
VCs are not compensated for the delay in distributing profits, they
may accelerate distributions to accelerate payouts to themselves. It
also limits opportunities for income smoothing.
c) One hundred twenty-five percent ceiling, 120 percent ceiling, and so
forth ("Percent Ceiling"). The VC receives his share of profits only if the
estimated net asset value of the fund, after the distribution, is more than
125 percent (120 percent, and so forth) of the cost basis of the fund's
securities. The undistributed portion of the VC's share of profits is paid
when the fund liquidates; the interest earned on the VC's unpaid carry
is allocated to limited partners pro rata. This method reduces credit risk
by leaving a part of the VC's carry in the fund until liquidation and re-
duces incentives to sell the fund's assets too early. The lower the ceil-
ing, the more VC-friendly the rule. The ceilings used by the funds in
my sample range from 100 percent to 125 percent.
d) Payback with no interest note ("Payback"). The VC receives a
prespecified percent (equal to carry) of each distribution. Because the
VC is entitled only to a share of profits but not to a share of repay-
ments of invested capital, he must simultaneously contribute to the
fund an amount equal to his share of repayment of capital. For exam-
ple, assuming 20 percent carry, if the fund invests $100 in a company
and receives $150 back, the VC would get 20 percent of $150 ($30)
and would have to repay 20 percent of $100 ($20). The agreements in
my sample that use this method do so only for distributions of securi-
ties, not cash. Most allow the repayment to be made through a non-
interest-bearing note, secured by the VC's interest in the fund, and
payable at liquidation. That is, the VC is systematically overpaid
throughout the fund's life and returns the overpayment at liquidation
without interest. The VCs, in effect, have the option to purchase the
securities from the fund in exchange for a zero-interest IOU."
33 This assumes that the risk of subsequent securities litigation against the fund or the VC
(who will be indemnified by the fund) or other unusual events is low enough to be ignored.
34 Partnership agreements typically allow VCs to opt out of distributions to themselves if
they so wish. If VCs think that distributed securities are overpriced, they can simply refuse to
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3. Popularity of distribution methods.
Table 3 summarizes the frequency with which VC funds in my
sample use different distribution methods. The most popular is the Re-
turn First method, followed by the 100 Percent Ceiling, 120 Percent
Ceiling, and Payback methods.
Overall, venture firms use a variety of distribution arrangements.
Many firms use different arrangements for cash and securities distri-
butions. A number use the highly VC-friendly Payback approach, but
only for securities distributions, not cash distributions.
4. The impact of distribution methods on VC compensation.
This Part contains a brief, nontechnical summary of the proce-
dure I use to estimate the value of distribution rules and their effect
on total VC compensation.5
To estimate the value of the interest-free loan created by the dis-
tribution rules, for a fund with an assumed eleven-year life, I need to
estimate: the timing and amount of capital calls, the timing and amount
of distributions to investors, overall fund profitability, and so forth. I do
so using data by fund vintage year provided to me by Sand Hill Eco-
nometrics for 1987 through 2006." For each of the eight distribution
rules found in my agreements, I create an algorithm formalizing how
the rule applies to these distributions.37 I next calculate the NPV of
take securities at that distribution. If VCs refuse a distribution, they receive a credit in their
capital account that will eventually be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of other companies
(albeit without interest).
35 For a full description, contact the author for a technical appendix.
36 Because full information on still-active funds is not yet available, I use average invest-
ment and distribution schedules from a pre-bubble vintage year (1992), provided by Sand Hill
Econometrics, to predict expected distributions for funds raised after 1996. Thus, for a fund
raised in 1998, I have data through 2006 and need to estimate year 10 and year 11. I use an aver-
age 1992 fund to establish the trend (percent change in distributions between year 9, year 10, and
year 11). I then use that trend to extrapolate year 10 and year 11 for my 1998 funds on the basis
of real data for year 9. In regressions that use distribution rules as variables, I limit the sample to
funds raised in 1997 or before, to limit the potential impact of relying on extrapolated data.
37 For example, for the Return First rule, the algorithm is as follows: For each month of the
fund's existence, examine the fund's distributions to investors and the amount that investors
contributed to the fund to date; if the former is lower than the latter, VCs get zero in that month;
if the former is higher than the latter, VCs gets the carry percent of the difference between the
former and the latter. Sum the undiscounted payments to VCs in each month of the fund's exis-
tence through the end of year eleven. Calculate "carry under the agreement"-the difference be-
tween the total undiscounted fund return and the total undiscounted investor contributions, multip-
lied by the applicable carry percentage. If the total undiscounted payment to the VC at the end of
year 11 is higher/lower than the carry under the agreement, the overpaid party transfers the amount
of overpayment to the other party without interest at the end of year eleven. This amount is called
"clawback." Using a 10 percent discount rate, calculate the net present value of all payments to
investors and VCs, including payments in midstream and the clawback. The sum of all discounted
payments to (by) VCs is the measure of the NPV of carry under the Return First distribution rule.
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carry payouts for each combination of vintage year (from 1987 to
2005), carry percentage, and distribution rule found in my agreements.
I compute the present value of all payments using a 10 percent dis-
count rate, which is meant to be a reasonable average rate over my
sample period for risky, performance-based cash flows.
Table 4, Panel A reports results for a hypothetical $100 million
fund with a 20 percent carry and raised in different years from 1987
through 1996, which experiences average results (timing and amount
of investments and distributions) for all funds raised in that year. The
impact of distribution rule on the NPV of the VC's return is striking.
For example, for an average fund raised in 1993, which turned out to
be a highly profitable year, the NPV of carry under the most popular
distribution method, Return First, is $27.43 million. Meanwhile, the
Payback rule would yield $34.56 million to the VC. That is, VCs can
increase their risky compensation by about 25 percent by switching to
a more favorable distribution rule. In a less profitable year (say, vin-
tage year 1988), the switch from the Return First rule to the Payback
rule increases the NPV of the VC's risky compensation by 45 percent,
from $17.47 million to $25.43 million. A more moderate change, from
Return First to 100 Percent Ceiling, would increase NPV for an aver-
age 1987 fund from $15.21 million to $17.66 million. In a very low-
profit year (1996), the Return First method gives the VC $8.19 million,
while the Payback method yields $14.72 million, an increase of
80 percent (albeit a modest increase in absolute dollar values).
Another way to assess the importance of distribution rules is to ask
how much, in NPV terms, investors take home vis-A-vis VCs under each
arrangement. Table 4, Panel B contains the results for an average fund
in a low-profit year (vintage year 1997), a medium-profit year (vintage
year 1995), and a high-profit year (vintage year 1993). This Table sepa-
rately presents results with and without management fees.
In the low-profit fund scenario, a $100 million fund generates a to-
tal return of $131 million over the fund's lifetime. Accounting for the
time value of money, investors lose about $15 million under the Return
First distribution rule and $22 million under the Payback rule. However,
the VC earns carry because the fund is "profitable" under the stan-
dard definition in partnership agreements, which ignores the time val-
ue of money. Under the Return First (Payback) rule, carry plus the
value of the interest-free loan results in the VC receiving $12.38 mil-
lion ($19.56 million) in NPV as supposedly performance-based com-
pensation, not counting management fees.
The medium-profit fund also shows a large difference in VC pay
based on the distribution method. The fund generates total undis-
counted returns of $254 million, and total NPV of the fund's invest-
ments, shared by the VC and investors, is $70 million. The NPV of the
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VC's carry ranges from $10.80 million to $27.04 million, depending on
the distribution rule. The VC thus earns between 15.38 percent and
38.50 percent of the fund's overall NPV before accounting for the
management fee. If we add the management fee (assumed to be a flat
2.5 percent of committed capital), the VC receives from 42.07 percent
to 65.19 percent of the fund's total NPV.
For the high-profit fund, the total undiscounted return (total NPV)
is $327 million ($107.85 million). The NPV of the VC's carry ranges
from $15.88 million to $34.56 million, or between 14.72 percent and
32.04 percent of total NPV, depending on the distribution rule. Includ-
ing the management fee, the VC's share of total NPV is between
32.11 percent and 49.43 percent.
In short, Table 4 shows that the nominal carry-the carry listed in
the partnership agreement-is often misleading. Depending on the dis-
tribution rule, fund profitability, and investment/distribution schedules,
a 20 percent nominal carry can translate into a real risky compensation
ranging from 15 percent to more than 100 percent of the fund's profits.
Next, I compare the differences in the NPV of the carry received
by VCs across distribution regimes to the differences in NPV caused by
variation in the other two principal elements of VC compensation-
management fee and carry percentage. In Table 4, Panel C, I present the
results for a $100 million fund that has profitability and invest-
ment/distribution schedules of an average medium-profit fund (average
1995 fund). I ask how much VC compensation is affected by (1) switch-
ing from one common management-fee rule to another (holding risky
compensation constant); (2) switching from one common carry percen-
tage to another (holding the distribution rule and the management fee
constant); and (3) across three common distribution rules (holding the
carry percentage and management fee constant). As before, I use a
7 percent annual discount rate for management fee and a 10 percent
rate for carry. Small changes in the assumed rates do not change the
results significantly.
An increase in management fee from a flat 2 percent to a flat
2.5 percent (a significant and heavily negotiated change) increases the
NPV of the management fee by a factor of 1.25, or $3.75 million. An
increase from a 20 percent carry to a 25 percent carry, assuming the
most popular distribution rule (Return First), also a significant, nego-
tiated change, increases the NPV of carry by a factor of 1.25, or
$5.07 million. A shift from the Return First (most popular distribution
rule) to the 100 Percent Ceiling (second-most popular rule) increases
the NPV of carry by a factor of 1.14, or $2.78 million. Thus, the effect
of a change in the distribution rule is of the same order as a change in
the management fee or carry percentage. Moreover, a change from
the most popular rule to the most pro-VC rule increases the NPV of
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carry by a factor of 1.33, from $20.40 million to $27.04 million. For a
high-profit (low-profit) fund, the dollars affected by the distribution
rule will be higher (lower) than in the medium-profit scenario shown
in Panel C, as will the relative importance of the distribution rule rela-
tive to management fee; the importance of distribution rule relative to
carry percentage will be lower (higher).
III. PREDICTORS OF VC COMPENSATION
In this Part, I ask what factors predict each of the three compo-
nents of VC compensation and the cumulative compensation.
A. Predictors of Total Management Fee
I first assess the overall relationship between VC quality and the
management-fee level. Gompers and Lerner find no association.38 In
contrast, I find evidence that proxies for VC quality predict a higher
management fee.
In Table 5, the dependent variable is NPV of the management fee,
as a percentage of committed capital over eleven years of a fund's life.
As proxies for VC quality, I use several measures of managed capital,
all normalized: fund size, lagged fund size, and total dollars raised by
the VC in all prior funds. I also use two measures of past performance:
the sold/total and failed/total ratios. Other control variables include an
indirect proxy for VC quality (fund number) and fund vintage year.
All regressions have venture-firm random effects and vintage-year
fixed effects, with robust standard errors. Regressions 1-4 use above-
median sold/total and failed/total measures of VC past success; regres-
sion 5 switches to continuous measures.
There are several sources of evidence that past performance pre-
dicts management fee. First, funds raised by VCs with an above-
median sold/total ratio have higher management fees. However, in
regression 5, a continuous measure of sold/total ratio is insignificant.
Second, the coefficient on above-median failed/total ratio is consistent-
ly negative, although not significant. In regression 5, the continuous
failed/total ratio is negative and marginally significant. Third, norma-
lized fund size is a significant or marginally significant predictor of a
higher fee in regressions 1, 3, and 4. In regression 2, 1 include both cur-
rent fund size and lagged fund size; both are positive, lagged fund size
is separately marginally significant, and the two together are jointly
significant (F = 7.76,p = 0.02).




In Table 6, I test whether proxies for VC quality predict carry
percentage. As for the management fee, there is evidence that the an-
swer is yes. Thus, I not only find significant variation in carry percen-
tage, in contrast to Gompers and Lerner and to Metrick and Yasuda,
but the variation is sensible -better VCs use higher percentages.39
In Table 6, I use the same specifications as in Table 5. All regres-
sions use venture-firm random effects and vintage-year fixed effects,
with robust standard errors.
The dependent variable is the carry percentage. Here, I ignore the
impact of the distribution rule on carry payouts and examine the no-
minal carry percentage. Fund size is positive and significant in regres-
sions 1, 3, and 4. In regression 2, I include both fund size and lagged
fund size as separate variables. The coefficient on fund size is similar to
the other regressions; it remains marginally significant, as are both va-
riables taken together (F = 5.54, i = 0.06).
Fund number is also a positive and significant predictor of the
carry percentage. The likely underlying story is twofold. First, VC
firms that have continued to raise new funds over an extended period
are likely to be of high quality. Second, investors are likely to resist
paying a high carry (above 20 percent) until a VC firm has proven itself
through the performance of its early funds.
An above-median sold/total ratio is generally marginally significant.
However, in regression 5, the continuous sold/total ratio is insignifi-
cant. Finally, venture-firm age takes a significant negative coefficient.
The interpretation of this result is unclear, given that I separately con-
trol for total dollars raised.
C. Distribution Rule
To measure the VC-friendliness of the distribution rule, I create a
distribution coefficient-the ratio of the total carry that a VC receives
under the rule specified in the agreement to the amount of carry that a
VC would have received under the most pro-investor rule (Escrow). The
distribution coefficient is based on the actual distribution rule and carry
percentage for each of my funds, and on the investment and payout
schedules of an average fund with the same vintage year. As discussed
39 For anecdotal evidence that some high-performing VCs raise their carry percentage, see
Kaplan, Accel Partners VII at 1 (cited in note 15). Accel already charged a 2.5 percent manage-
ment fee and 25 percent carry, and wanted to raise its carry to 30 percent. Kaplan writes: "At a
30 percent carry, Accel would join a select group of private equity firms that included Bain Capi-
tal; Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers; and, under some circumstances, Benchmark Capital." Id.
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before, rules for cash distributions are somewhat different from rules
for securities distributions. I report the results for cash distributions.
Figure C summarizes the distribution coefficients for funds in my
sample. The coefficients for distributions of cash vary from 1 (for one
fund that uses the Escrow method) to 44.20 (for funds that use the Ceil-
ing 100 percent method). Distribution coefficients based on the rules
for securities distributions would show an even larger spread, from 1 to
130.74, because four funds use the highly VC-friendly Payback method
for securities distributions, but none do so for cash distributions. Figure D
shows the value of the distribution rule as a ratio of the NPV of inter-
est-free loan generated by the distribution rule over the fund's commit-
ted capital. It ranges from just over zero to 0.6.
Table 7, Panel A provides an ordinary least squares (OLS) re-
gression analysis of which VC and fund characteristics predict the dis-
tribution coefficient. Because the distribution coefficient depends on
the timing and amount of distributions, it cannot be readily calculated
for currently unliquidated funds. Thus, in Panel A, I limit the sample to
funds raised before 1997. The vintage-year restriction reduces the size
of my sample; thus, to preserve degrees of freedom, I do not use vin-
tage-year fixed effects, as I do in Tables 5 and 6. I use venture-firm ran-
dom effects with robust standard errors, as in prior tables. As discussed
before, rules for cash distributions are somewhat different from rules for
securities distributions. I report the results for rules governing cash distri-
butions. The results are similar for the securities distribution rules (not
reported). I otherwise use the same independent variables as in Tables 5
and 6, where I study the predictors of management fee and carry.
The only significant predictor of the loan value is the vintage
year. In robustness checks, I study other firm and fund characteristics,
such as location of the VC, dollars invested, and so forth. None emerge
as significant.
One problem with the distribution coefficient is that its value is
determined ex post based on performance that was not known to fund
participants when the partnership agreement was signed. In Panel B, I
instead use an ordinal ranking of distribution rules. This measure is
independent of the fund's ex post performance and therefore might
better reflect the parties' expectations when they were negotiating the
agreement. Because this measure does not depend on performance, I
do not need to restrict the sample to fully liquidated funds. All regres-
sions are ordered probit with venture firm clusters and robust stan-
dard errors. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 when the distri-
bution rule is Escrow; 2 for Return First; 3 for 125 Percent Ceiling; 4
for 120 Percent Ceiling; 5 for 115 Percent Ceiling; 6 for 110 Percent
Ceiling; 7 for 100 Percent Ceiling; and 8 for Payback -thus higher val-
ues indicate more VC-friendly rules. All independent variables are the
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same as in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, Panel A. No variable is a sig-
nificant predictor of the distribution rule. Fund vintage year, which
was significant in Panel A, is positive but insignificant.
D. Are Distribution Provisions Determined by Lawyers?
The previous Part raises a puzzle -distribution rules can have a
large effect on VC compensation, yet both VCs and investors claim to
understand them poorly, and the variation in distribution rules is not
strongly predicted by fund or venture firm characteristics. What else
might predict this variation?
Because distribution provisions are law-intensive, one possibility is
that some VCs leave the choice of a distribution rule to lawyers, who
reuse standard forms from one client to another. In my interviews, VCs
often disclaimed knowledge of the details of the distribution rules, ex-
plaining that lawyers wrote the distribution provisions. The corporate
VC lawyers who write the bulk of the partnership agreements often
disclaimed knowledge as well, saying distribution provisions were the
province of the tax lawyers. If lawyers determine distribution rules,
however, one might expect that distribution rules drafted by the same
law firms for different venture firms would be similar. This is not so.
I have only partial data on which law firm drafted which agree-
ment. The relevant subset of my data contains three clusters of agree-
ments. In each cluster, one law firm wrote agreements for three VC
firms; each VC firm used those agreements for several funds. I look at
distribution provisions within each law-firm cluster, across funds and
firms, to see whether there is substantial variation. For each agree-
ment, I look separately at cash and in-kind distribution provisions. The
results are reported in Table 7, Panel C. The upper line in each cell is
the distribution method for cash; the bottom line is the distribution
method for securities.
The least we can say is that law firms do not blindly reuse the
same standard set of distribution provisions for all clients. None of the
three law firms repeated the exact combination of distribution ar-
rangements. For example, law firm B had the same arrangements for
two of its VC firms, but a completely different arrangement for the
third. Law firms A and C had different provisions for each of the three
VC firms in my sample.
This discussion cannot completely refute the hypothesis that law-
yers determine distribution provisions. Large law firms, like the ones in
my sample, may have several attorneys writing partnership agreements,
and therefore may have several types of agreements in their libraries,
which other attorneys then reuse without consulting their clients or ad-
vise their clients to use. Still, the amount of heterogeneity is surprisingly
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high and suggests at least some customization. . The puzzle of why VC
firms choose the distribution rules that they do remains unsolved.
E. Total Compensation
In Table 8, I ask what predicts overall VC compensation, taking
all three elements of compensation into account and holding fund size
constant. To isolate the impact of contractual provisions on compensa-
tion, I assume that each of my funds has $100 million in committed
capital, makes only cash distributions, and has the investment and dis-
tribution schedule that is average for a fund of that vintage year. For
funds raised after 1997, 1 use the extrapolation procedure described in
Part II.C.4. I use the actual compensation terms (management-fee
formula, carry percent, and distribution rule) for each fund from my
partnership agreements. The dependent variable is the sum of the
NPV of VC's carry (which incorporates the value of the distribution
rule) and the NPV of the management fee. Independent variables are
the same as in Tables 5 through 7. Because the dependent variable is
based on a true compensation scheme found in each agreement, ap-
plied to an assumed fund size of $100 million, the independent varia-
ble "fund size" (the true size of each fund) functions here only as a
proxy for the VC's quality. All regressions are OLS with venture-firm
random effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors.
I find that past performance predicts current compensation. An
above-median sold/total ratio predicts higher compensation, as does a
below-median failed/total ratio. However, in regression 5, continuous
sold/total and failed/total measures are insignificant. Thus, if more suc-
cessful VCs are able to raise larger funds, they may get a double bene-
fit-they will earn the management fee and carry on a larger base, and
may also earn higher compensation per dollar of committed capital.
Vintage year is also a strong positive predictor of total compensa-
tion, even after controlling for fund size and number, and for past per-
formance. This suggests that, on average, VC compensation has been
rising over time.
IV. FUND SIZE
As discussed above, the management fee is typically calculated as
a portion of fund size. And carry, measured in dollars, is directly re-
lated to fund size. Thus, fund size is a strong predictor of VCs' overall
take-home pay. Indeed, in regressions similar to Table 8, in which I
40 None of the VC firms in my sample changed law firms across funds. Thus, the intra-law
firm differences cannot be explained by lawyers moving from one firm to another and taking
both their clients and agreements with them.
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measure VC compensation in dollars and use actual fund size rather
than an assumed $100 million fund, fund size strongly predicts VC
compensation and swamps all other measures. In this Part, I study the
predictors of fund size. To do so, I formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 a: positive relationship between the size of a new fund
and the size of the VC's past funds. The size of a VC's prior funds may
positively predict the size of newer funds. Several sources might contri-
bute to this relationship. First, if fund size is associated with VC quality,
then VCs who raised larger funds in the past should be able to raise
larger funds in the future. If my proxies for VC quality (sold/total,
failed/total, and so forth) are imperfect, as they surely are, this relation-
ship might exist even controlling for those proxies. Second, VCs who
have run larger funds in the past have organizational resources that
can be devoted both to raising new, larger funds and to investing a
larger amount of capital. Third, fund sizes may be "sticky" for several
reasons. If current investors know more about a VC's quality than out-
siders do (or at least think they know more), then, other things equal,
investors may prefer to reinvest with the same VCs rather than switch-
ing to another VC, which would make fund sizes "sticky." Many VCs
encourage stickiness by offering the first opportunity to invest in a
new fund to investors in the previous fund, and often offering loyal
investors other benefits, such as a seat on the advisory board. Investor
"stickiness" may also reflect transaction costs: reinvesting with the
same VC involves lower investigative efforts.
Hypothesis 1 b: positive relationship between the size of a new fund
and the VC's past performance. VCs with better past performance, as
measured by the sold/total or IPO/total ratio, should be able to raise
larger funds.
Hypothesis 1c: positive relationship between past and current size
and between past performance and current size only for some VCs. The
relationships posited in Hypotheses la and lb may exist only for a
subset of VCs. First, the size and performance of the immediately pre-
ceding fund should be lesser predictors of fund size for a new fund
raised by an older VC because older VCs are more likely to be judged
on their long-term record. Second, among young VCs, there might be
a difference between those who were "good" from the outset (as prox-
ied by later raising multiple funds) for reasons not captured by my
performance proxies, and other young VCs, holding performance con-
stant. We might then expect a positive past/current size relationship
for "good" young VCs but not others.
Hypothesis Id: change in sizes between the current fund N and the
immediately preceding fund N - 1 is predicted by recent past perfor-
mance If the size of fund N- 1 reflects the VC's performance through
fund N- 2, then we might expect that the change in size from fund N- 1
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to fund N is predicted by the new performance information investors
receive, and thus by the change in VC performance between funds N- 2
and N-1.
Unlike VC compensation, fund size is public information; there-
fore, I am able to use the entire universe of stand-alone venture funds
from VentureXpert (not just the funds for which I have partnership
agreements) to estimate the predictors of fund size. Because VC per-
formance can be fully estimated only after the fund is liquidated, I
restrict the sample to funds raised in 1997 and earlier.
A. Predictors of Fund Size
Table 9, Panel A reports the results. Columns (1) through (4) in-
clude all funds that VentureXpert defines as "venture funds" raised
before 1997. Defining "venture funds" differently (for example, by re-
stricting investment stage to "seed" and "early stage") does not signifi-
cantly change the results. In Column (5), the sample is limited to funds
run by "good" young VCs (funds 1 through 5), who went on to be-
come successful by raising more than five funds in later years. In Col-
umn (6), the sample is funds run by "bad" young VCs (funds 1 through
5) who did not proceed to raise more than five funds overall. Because
all funds in this Table are raised before 1997, enough time has elapsed
to say that VCs who raised no funds since then are not likely to con-
tinue. In Column (7), the sample is funds run by old successful VCs
(funds 6 and higher). All regressions are OLS with venture-firm and
vintage-year fixed effects and venture-firm clusters.1
The dependent variable is fund size, in millions of 2008 dollars.
Independent variables include: four size measures (the size of the
VC's previous fund N-1, the fund before that N -2, the total dollars
raised by that VC in all prior funds, and the above-median dummy for
total dollars raised in all prior funds); two measures of cumulative past
performance (dummy variables for above-median sold/total ratio and
above-median failed/total ratio); and fund vintage year. Because I con-
trol for year of VC firm formation, the "total dollars previously raised"
variable proxies for dollars raised per year and not for VC firm age.
I find support for Hypothesis la. As Columns (1) through (4) of
Table 9 indicate, VCs who raised more money in the past raise more
money in the future. Investors seem to have long-term memory: while
both the size of the immediately preceding fund and total dollars raised
41 In regressions that use my agreements-based sample of sixty-eight, the sample size does
not allow me to use venture-firm fixed effects and clusters plus vintage-year fixed effects. There-
fore, I have to use weaker specifications
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in all prior funds predict the size of a current fund, the total dollars that
the VC raised in all prior funds is statistically a much stronger predictor.
Past performance matters, too (Hypothesis 1b): VCs with an
above-median sold/total ratio raise larger funds. However, the
IPO/total ratio does not predict new fund size (not reported). This is
not consistent with the view that VCs seek to manipulate the more
visible performance indicator provided by IPOs to boost future fun-
draisings, at the expense of broader, potentially more relevant indica-
tors (companies sold, regardless of method). Investors do not seem to
reward IPOs alone, at least not through higher fund sizes.
I next ask whether the link between past performance and current
fund size is affected by the age of the VC. In Columns (5) through (7), I
find evidence supporting Hypothesis 1c. Young VCs (on their first
through fifth funds) who went on to raise more than five funds show a
positive relationship between prior sold/total ratio and fund size (Col-
umn (5)). In unreported regressions, I also find strong predictive power
of the total dollars raised by these VCs before this fund. However,
young VCs who did not proceed past the fifth fund exhibited no such
relationship (Column (6)).
Finally, in regression 7, I examine "good" young VCs once they be-
come old (raised at least five prior funds). The relationship between
past performance or lagged fund size and the current fund size disap-
pears. This unexpected result deserves further explanation. It suggests
that older VCs may, in part, be coasting on past reputation.
Note however that the venture-firm fixed effects capture any
time-invariant component of venture-firm quality. Thus, if investors
know (perhaps based on prior reputation of individuals), or believe,
that some VC firms are simply good or bad, and this time-invariant
component predicts fund size, this effect will be captured by the fixed
effect and I will not observe it.
B. Predictors of Change in Fund Size
In Table 9, Panel B, I ask whether a change in prior performance
predicts a change in fund size. The answer is no. I again use venture-
firm fixed effects and clusters and vintage-year fixed effects. The de-
pendent variable is the difference between the size of fund N and the
size of fund N - 1. Independent variables are changed as well: total dol-
lars raised before fund N minus total dollars raised before fund N - 1;
the size of fund N - 1 minus the size of fund N - 2; the sold/total ratio
for all companies funded by a VC in funds prior to fund N, minus the
same ratio for fund N - 1; the failed/total ratio prior to fund N minus
the failed/total ratio prior to fund N- 1. 1 also control for fund number
and fund vintage year. The results reported in Panel B are robust to
changes in control variables.
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There are two principal results. First, the prior change in fund size
(or the prior change in total dollars raised by the VC in prior funds) is
a negative predictor of a new change in fund size. This raises the possi-
bility that some VC firms that raise especially large funds realize that
they cannot find good investments for that amount of money and cut
back size for their next fund, or that investors realize this and reduce
the amounts they are willing to invest. Second, changes in perfor-
mance only mildly predict changes in fund size. The change in sold/total
ratio is marginally significant in regression 3, but only barely, and this
result is sensitive to the choice of control variables. Thus, fund size
seems to relate more strongly to the VC firm's long-term performance
than to the performance of the immediately prior fund.
V. PAY-PERFORMANCE ELASTICITY OF VC COMPENSATION
I now ask what portion of the VC's total compensation comes
from risky sources (carry). For this, I look at a series of hypothetical
$100 million funds raised in each year between 1986 and 1997 (that is,
fully liquidated funds). I assume that each fund has the average perfor-
mance and investment/distribution schedule for that year. For simplici-
ty, I use the compensation scheme comprised of the most common ele-
ments found in my agreements: 20 percent carry, 2.5 percent flat man-
agement fee based on committed capital, and Return First distribution
rule. I calculate the NPV of both risky and riskless compensation using
Sand Hill Econometrics data on capital calls, distributions, and profita-
bility. This is, of course, an ex post estimate of compensation riskiness
and may not reflect the parties' ex ante expectations. Still, the average
over time should be a respectable measure of ex ante expectations.
Figure E reports the results. The portion of management fee in
the total compensation package fluctuates between 40 percent (for
funds of 1994 vintage, a relatively high-profit vintage year) and
78 percent (for funds of 1997 vintage, a low-profit year), with an aver-
age of 51 percent across this twelve-year period.
In Figure F, I estimate the pay-performance elasticity of VC com-
pensation. For each of the vintage years between 1986 and 1997, I cal-
culate full VC compensation based on the returns of an average fund
raised in that year, assuming the same compensation scheme as in Fig-
ure E, and then estimate how much VC compensation would increase
for a 1 percent increase in the total NPV of the fund's investments.
A 1 percent increase in fund returns translates into a 0.47 percent
increase on average in total VC compensation across vintage years,
with a low of 0.38 percent (in vintage year 1997) and a high of
0.5 percent (in vintage years 1989 and 1990). This is not surprising giv-
en that a significant portion of VC compensation does not depend on
fund performance. These are averages across all funds. My estimate of
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the pay-performance elasticity of VC compensation is only modestly
higher than the elasticity of cash compensation estimated for CEOs of
S&P 500 industrials (0.26 percent), somewhat higher than S&P 500
utilities (0.40 percent), and slightly lower than in S&P 500 financials
(0.49 percent). 2 However, the CEO figures understate overall elastici-
ty of compensation, because they exclude stock and stock option
compensation. Overall, VC firm compensation elasticities fall in the
same range as CEO elasticities.
VI. COMPENSATION COMPLEXITY AND INCOME SMOOTHING
A. Is Complexity Used to Hide True Compensation?
As we have seen in Part II.A, it is difficult to construct reasons for
the management fee to be more complex than a percentage of com-
mitted capital or even a flat dollar amount, perhaps varying over time.
The general executive compensation literature suggests that pay com-
plexity can be used to camouflage the total level of compensation.
This is only partly the case for VCs. As discussed above, distribution
rules are both obscure and valuable. However, the picture is the oppo-
site for the management fee. The more complex, more manipulable
managed-capital base is systematically lower than the committed-
capital base, yet the fee percentage is not systematically higher. This
implies that use of a managed-capital base is associated with lower
overall management-fee levels.
Additional analysis confirms the surface picture. I present basic
summary statistics in Table 2, Panel B. The use of committed capital is
associated with higher management fee NPV (on average, 16.84 percent
of committed capital over eleven years versus 10.91 percent for use of
managed capital). There is also no evidence of gaming within funds using
the committed-capital base. The most straightforward formula (constant
percentage) yields a higher NPV of management fee than a formula in-
volving increasing or declining percentage, albeit not significantly so.
Another source of complexity is a change in formula in the mid-
stream of a fund's life. Here, too, greater complexity predicts lower
compensation. The principal change is from a committed-capital base
to the lower managed-capital base, without an offsetting increase in the
fee percentage. Funds that use the same formula throughout their lives
have higher aggregate fees on average (16.85 percent of committed cap-
ital) than funds that change the formula mid-stream (12.93 percent of
committed capital).
42 See Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2524 table 7,2526 figure 6B (cited in note 1).
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This result survives in regressions in which I control for VC and
fund characteristics, as reported in Table 10. The dependent variable in
all columns is the NPV of management fee as a percent of the fund's
committed capital. 3 All regressions are OLS with venture-firm ran-
dom effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors. The
results are similar with venture-firm fixed effects (but some variables
drop out because of lack of variation within firms) and are also similar
with fixed effects for year of venture firm formation (instead of fund
vintage year), and without any time fixed effects.
Column (1) is the basic specification, containing only the rule
dummies. Rule 1 through Rule 8 are dummies for formulas under which
a management fee is calculated; the omitted rule is Rule 9 (increasing
then declining percentage, change in base from committed to managed
capital). The rules are numbered roughly in the order of increasing
complexity and manipulability. The first four rules involve a nonmani-
pulable base, committed capital. The coefficients on the dummies for
three of those rules (Rules 1, 2, and 4) are significant and positive, in-
dicating that funds that calculate management fees under these rules
have higher aggregate management fees. Economic significance is
large as well. These three rules predict from 4.7 percent to 8.7 percent
higher management fee NPV than for the omitted category. The coef-
ficients for formulas based in full or in part on managed capital are
insignificant or, for Rule 8, negative.
In Column (2), I add total dollars raised by the VC in all prior
funds (normalized as discussed in Part I.C) and the age of the venture
firm in the year when the fund was raised. In Column (3), I use fund
size and fund number, both normalized, instead of the total dollars
raised in prior funds and the age of the VC when the fund was raised.
The results are very similar to those reported in Column (1). In ro-
bustness checks, I include other control variables, such as measures of
prior performance and year of venture firm formation, with similar
results (not reported).
In Column (4), instead of using dummies for individual rules, I use
a proxy for complexity-a dummy for whether the formula changes
during the fund's life (for example, the base switches from committed
to managed capital, or the percentage changes over time). I include
the same controls as in Column (3). The coefficient on the "changes"
variable is negative and significant, indicating again that funds that use
more complex management fee rules have lower total management
43 For funds using managed capital as a base, I calculate the cumulative fee over eleven
years based on Sand Hill Econometrics data on capital calls and distributions, and express that
value as the percent of committed capital.
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fees. In Column (5), I confirm that the simpler formula-based only
on committed capital -predicts higher compensation for fee calcula-
tion. The coefficient on the "committed capital base" dummy variable
is positive and highly significant.
B. What Predicts Complexity of Management Fee?
Next, I ask which venture firm or fund characteristics predict the
degree of complexity of the management fee. I use a managed-capital
base as a proxy for complexity. In Table 11, Panel A, I divide the funds
in my sample into three groups. The dependent variable equals 0 for
funds that use a committed-capital base in all years; 1 for funds that use
a managed-capital base sometime during the second half of a fund's life
(years 5-11); and 2 for funds that use a managed-capital base during the
entire second half of a fund's life and at least sometime during the first
half" Thus, a higher group number indicates greater use of managed-
capital base. I ask which fund or firm characteristics predict the choice
among the three groups. All regressions are ordered probit with ven-
ture-firm and vintage-year fixed effects and robust standard errors.45
In Column (1), I ask whether basic VC characteristics predict the
three choices for the management-fee base. As expected from Table 5,
higher overall management fee predicts less use of a managed-capital
base. In addition, controlling for management-fee level, older VCs and
more reputable VCs (as measured by total dollars raised in prior funds)
make less use of the managed-capital base. In Column (2), I add more
measures of VC quality-the normalized sold/total and failed/total
ratios. The results are consistent with those reported in Column (1). In
addition, VCs with a higher portion of failed companies are more like-
ly to use a managed-capital base.
These results only deepen the puzzle of why VC firms use a ma-
naged-capital base at all. Apparently, lower-quality VCs compete for
business in part by charging lower management fees, as seen in Table 5.
Some VCs do so not by simply charging a substantially lower percen-
tage of committed capital but instead by keeping the percentage clos-
er to that of better VCs, but applying it to a smaller base, which is also
more complex and manipulable.
In Panel B, I ask what factors predict use of the classic manage-
ment-fee formula (flat percentage of committed capital). This question
is interesting because the choice to deviate from the traditional system
44 No fund in my sample used a managed-capital base in early years and switched to com-
mitted capital in later years.
45 I use venture-firm fixed effects rather than random effects, as in some earlier tables,
because of Stata limitations on the use of random effects with ordered probit models.
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might be more important than gradations within nontraditional sys-
tems. I use logit regressions with robust standard errors; the depen-
dent variable equals 1 when the classic formula is used and 0 other-
wise. Column (1) includes only basic independent variables (vintage
year, total dollars raised, and VC age); Column (2) adds two measures
of VC past performance (total dollars raised in all prior funds and the
sold/total ratio, both normalized). In robustness checks, I also use fund
size and number, and total management fee and carry, and find similar
results, which are not reported here. Fund vintage year positively pre-
dicts the use of the classic formula. Thus, my data does not support the
common perception that the flat fee system is being replaced by more
complicated variations.
C. Are Management-fee Schedules Used to Smooth VC Incomes?
Because carry is based on the sales of portfolio companies, the
stream of carry payments is cyclical (typically low in early years, high
in later years), and often unpredictable. I next consider whether VCs
use management-fee schedules to smooth their total income, either
across multiple funds or across years within a single fund. A simple
income-smoothing strategy would be to increase nonrisky compensa-
tion during the years when carry payouts are predictably low.
One possibility is income smoothing within funds. Because carry
is higher in the later years of a fund's life, VCs can smooth their in-
come by front-loading their management fees. This might be more
likely for VCs who expect a high carry (as proxied by past success). A
more complex possibility is income smoothing across funds. VCs com-
monly raise a series of funds; each fund generates a stream of manage-
ment fees and carries. If VCs adopt across-funds income-smoothing
strategies, then management-fee schedules should depend on the fre-
quency of fundraisings. A VC who raises a new fund every four to six
years can expect a stream of carry every four to six years; he might
prefer higher management fees in the middle of each fund's life.
In Table 12, Panel A, I ask which factors predict income smooth-
ing within a given fund. The dependent variable is the ratio of the
NPV of the management fee that a VC earns during years 1-5 to the
total NPV during the fund's entire eleven-year life. A higher value
indicates a more front-loaded fee. All regressions are OLS with ven-
ture-firm random effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust stan-
dard errors. Column (1) is a basic specification investigating the rela-
tionship between the total VC compensation and front-loading of the
management fee. Two findings emerge. First, more established VCs
(who raised more capital in prior funds) are less likely to have a front-
loaded fee, which is not consistent with income smoothing within
funds. In robustness checks, I also use fund number as a proxy for VC
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quality, with similar results - VCs who raised more funds in the past
have management fees that are less front-loaded. Second, funds with
higher total management fees are less likely to front-load their man-
agement fee. This might seem like a natural consequence of using ma-
naged capital-based fees: this base produces both lower total fee and
a more front-loaded fee. However, there is nothing about the use of a
particular base that requires these two outcomes to be linked. It is
easy to structure a managed capital-based formula that would give
the VC the same total compensation, with any variation one wants
across the years of a fund's life, by using a time-varying fee percen-
tage. Yet in practice, large variations in the fee percentage across time
are not common.
In Column (2), I ask whether the VC firm's prior performance
predicts front-loading of the management fee. The sold/total and
failed/total ratios are not significant predictors of front-loading.
In Table 12, Panel B, I find evidence consistent with income
smoothing across funds. The dependent variable here is a dummy that
equals 1 if the management fee peaks in middle years of the fund's life
and 0 otherwise. The key independent variable is the "Fundraising
Cycle Dummy," which equals 1 if a VC firm raised prior funds every
four to six years and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are similar to
prior tables. All regressions are logit with venture-firm random effects
and robust standard errors.
The Fundraising Cycle Dummy emerges as a strong predictor of a
midstream peak in a fund's management fee, across all three specifica-
tions. This is consistent with the between-funds income-smoothing
hypothesis. Total management fee is a significant negative predictor of
a mid-fund-life fee peak; this result is consistent with prior tables.
CONCLUSION
This Article contributes to the literature on the venture capital
industry, and on executive compensation more generally, by analyzing
the compensation of VCs. I show that VC compensation has an impor-
tant third element - the distribution rule - which determines the value
of an interest-free loan from investors to VCs. This element is eco-
nomically large but has not been discussed in prior work. I also find
substantial variation in compensation levels across VC firms, again in
contrast to prior work. Some of this variation is predicted by measures
of VC quality, with better VCs receiving a higher fraction of total fund
NPV, both through higher management fee and through higher carry
percentage; but some is not. In particular, distribution rules vary wide-
ly across funds, yet their VC-friendliness is not strongly predicted by
proxies for VC quality. Nor are distribution rules simply delegated to
lawyers -the same law firm will often draft different distribution rules
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for different clients. Better VCs tend to raise larger funds, as do VCs
who have raised larger funds before. Some elements of VC compensa-
tion appear to be used to smooth VC incomes. Compensation com-
plexity predicts lower total compensation, at least in management fee,
in contrast to the compensation of corporate executives.
My findings have implications for executive compensation. They
suggest that the legal and institutional barriers to investor participa-
tion in setting executive compensation do not fully explain some key
features of compensation contracts. Investors in venture funds are
able to negotiate compensation terms directly, yet VC compensation is
still complex-sometimes counterproductively so as more complex
management-fee rules are more manipulable than simpler rules-
spread across multiple elements, and, at least for distribution rules,
opaque and poorly understood by investors and even by VCs. The
pay-performance sensitivity is very similar to that of public company
executives. On the other hand, with the exception of distribution rules,
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Vintage Year
Note: Represents percent change in total VC compensation for average fund raised in the cor-
responding year. Assumes 20 percent carry, management fee of 2.5 percent of committed capital,










Total Mean for Funds Raised for My for My
Number My Sample after 1983 Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Venture Funds (Firms) 68 (28)
Vintage Year of Fund 1997 1995 1983 2005
Year of VC Firm Formation 1987 1988 1963 2004
Fund Size (in 2008 $M) 401.70 215.19 30.51 1105.94
Fund Number 5 2 1 13
Management Fee
(as Percent of Committed Cap) 14.14 3.66 20.15
Management Fee ($M) 56.58 3.98 207.33
Carry (Percent of Profits) 22.30 12.5 30
Ratio IPO/AII Companies by Fund 0.125 0.006 0 0.5
Ratio Sold/All Companies by Fund 0.449 0.278 0.125 1
California Funds (Firms) 36 (17)
New York Funds (Firms) 3 (3)
Massachusetts Funds (Firms) 3 (3)
Note: All funds are US-based venture funds raised by stand-alone venture capital firm& Partnership









No Rule Description Funds Firms Capital
1 Constant Percent; 21 8 16.85
Committed Capital Base
2 Declining Percent; 15 7 16.62Committed Capital Base
3 Increasing Percent, 2 1 11.99
Then Declining Percent; Committed Capital Base
4 Constant Percent; 1 1 20.15
Base Is Committed Capital Declining by Formula
5 Constant Percent; 5 3 9.29
Switch from Committed to Managed Capital Base
6 Increasing Percent; 3 2 11.68Switch from Committed to Managed Capital Base
7 Declining Percent; 18 5 11.14
Switch from Committed to Managed Capital Base
8 Increasing Percent, Then Declining Percent; 1 1 3.32
Managed Capital Base
9 Increasing Percent, Then Declining Percent; 3 1 12.39
Switch from Committed to Managed Capital Base
Panel B
Summary Statistics for Groups of Rules
Group-of-rules Description Funds Firms Mean NPV
Committed Capital Base Only 38 16 16.84
Base Other Than Only Committed Capital 30 12 10.91
Committed Capital Base with Percent Constant 21 8 16.85
Committed Capital Base with Percent Not Constant 17 8 16.57
Fee Formula Changes in Midstream 47 20 12.93
Fee Formula Does Not Change in Midstream 21 8 16.85
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF VENTURE FUNDS USING DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTION
METHODS, FOR DISTRIBUTIONS OF CASH AND SECURITIES
Cash Securities
Distribution Method Distributions Distributions
Escrow.
VCs receive no carry until liquidation of fund. Carry allocated to 1 1
VCs is place in escrow; interest to fund.
Return 100 Percent First.
VCs receive no carry until investors get distributions equal 30 30
to capital contributions. Afterwards, VCs receive full carry at
each distribution.
125 Percent Ceiling.
VCs receive carry only if estimated NPV of fund, after 2 2
distribution, is above 125 percent of the cost value of securities.
120 Percent Ceiling.
VCs receive carry only if estimated NPV of fund, after 13 11
distribution, is above 120 percent of the cost value of securities
115 Percent Ceiling.
VCs receive carry only if estimated NPV of fund, after 2 2
distribution, is above 115 percent of the cost value of securities.
110 Percent Ceiling.
VCs receive carry only if estimated NPV of fund, after 0 2
distribution, is above 110 percent of the cost value of securities.
100 Percent Ceiling.
VCs receive carry only if estimated NPV of fund, after 20 16
distribution, is above 100 percent of the cost value of securities.
Payback with No Interest.
VCs receive a portion of revenues at each distribution, while they 0 4
are only entitled to a portion of profits. VCs repay the difference
at liquidation time, with no interest.




Net present value of risky compensation that the VC receives under different distribution
rules. The fund is assumed to be $100 million with 20 percent carry. Each row has a result for a
fund raised in the corresponding year, with an average schedule of capital calls and distribu-
tions for all funds raised in that year, based on data from Sand Hill Econometrics. Only fully
liquidated funds are used for this Table (raised before 1997).
125 120 115 110 100
Vintage Return Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Year Escrow First Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Payback
1987 9.39 15.21 16.32 16.54 16.80 17.08 17.66 23.31
1988 10.83 17.47 17.97 18.18 18.41 18.66 19.17 25.43
1989 13.00 21.04 20.98 21.22 21.49 21.77 22.36 28.95
1990 13.87 22.95 22.65 22.91 23.18 23.45 24.04 30.69
1991 14.48 24.66 24.43 24.70 24.99 25.29 25.94 32.16
1992 14.30 24.84 25.04 25.31 25.60 25.89 26.52 32.13
1993 15.88 27.43 28.01 28.28 28.56 28.85 29.46 34.56
1994 16.01 28.47 29.60 29.88 30.15 30.43 30.99 35.58
1995 10.80 20.38 21.70 21.99 22.29 22.58 23.18 27.04
1996 3.66 8.19 10.16 10.37 10.59 10.84 11.35 14.72
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Panel B
Net present value of risky VC compensation, net present value of return to investors, and portion
of fund profits allocated to VCs, both before and after payment of management fee. Calculated
separately under eight different distribution rules; and under three different assumptions about
capital calls, payouts, and fund profitability (low-, medium-, and high-profit funds, based on
average funds raised in 1997, 1995, and 1993, respectively). The fund is assumed to be $100 mil-
lion, with 20 percent carry, and management fee calculated as 2.5 percent of committed capital.
Profit is assumed to be measured before management fee.
125 120 115 110 100
Return Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Escrow First Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Ceiling Payback
Low-profit Fund (Average for Vintage Year 1997)
VC Carry 9.17 12.38 15.01 15.22 15.45 15.70 16.20 19.56
Investors -11.87 -15.07 -17.71 -17.92 -18.14 -18.39 -18.89 -22.26
Total -2.69 -2.69 -2.69 -2.69 -2.69 -2.69 -2.69 -2.69
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Excluding >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
Management Fee
VC Carry Plus Fee 27.92 31.13 33.76 33.97 34.2 34.45 34.95 38.31
Investors Minus Fee -30.62 -33.82 -36.46 -36.67 -36.89 -37.14 -37.64 -41.01
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Including >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
Management Fee
Medium-profit Fund (Average for Vintage Year 1995)
VC 10.80 20.38 21.70 21.99 22.29 22.58 23.18 27.04
Investors 59.44 49.86 48.54 48.25 47.95 47.66 47.06 43.20
Total 70.24 70.24 70.24 70.24 70.24 70.24 70.24 70.24
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Excluding 15.38 29.01 30.89 31.31 31.73 32.15 33.00 38.50
Management Fee
VC Carry Plus Fee 29.55 39.13 40.45 40.74 41.04 41.33 41.93 45.79
Investors Minus Fee 40.69 31.11 29.79 29.5 29.2 28.91 28.31 24.45
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Including 42.07 55.71 57.59 58.00 58.43 58.84 59.70 65.19
Management Fee
High-profit Fund (Average for Vitage Year 1993)
VC 15.88 27.43 28.01 28.28 28.56 28.85 29.46 34.56
Investors 91.97 80.42 79.84 79.57 79.29 79 78.39 73.29
Total 107.85 107.85 107.85 107.85 107.85 107.85 107.85 107.85
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Excluding
Management Fee
VC Carry Plus Fee
Investors Minus Fee
Percent of NPV Allocated
to VC, Including
Management Fee
14.72 25.43 25.97 26.22 26.48 26.75
34.63 46.18 46.76 47.03 47.31 47.6
73.22 61.67 61.09 60.82 60.54 60.25








Effect of changes in management fee, carry, and distribution rule on VC compensation, for average
$100M fund raised in 1995 (medium profitability year). In Columns (1) and (2), reported values are
for NPV of management fee, calculated as 2 percent and 2.5 percent of committed capital, respec-
tively, over eleven years In Columns (3) and (4), the distribution rule is held constant (Return First,
most popular rule) and carry percentage changes from 20 percent to 25 percent, respectively. In
Columns (5), (6), and (7), the carry percentage is held constant (most popular, 20 percent) and the
distribution rule changes from the second-most popular rule (100 percent ceiling) to the most popu-
lar rule (Return Fist) to the most pro-VC rule (Payback), respectively. Discount rate is 7 percent






Effect of Distribution Rule
on NPV of Carry
(20 Percent Carry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
20 25 100
Flat 2 Flat 2.5 Percent Percent Percent Return
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TABLE 5
This Table shows predictors of the cumulative management fee over the lifetime of a fund. The
dependent variable is net present value of management fee as a percent of fund's committed
capital over the 11-year fund life. Independent variables are: normalized fund size; lagged nor-
malized fund size; normalized fund number; dummy for above-median sold/total ratio (ratio of
sold companies-through IPO, acquisition, merger, buyout-to all companies funded by this
venture firm in all prior funds); dummy for above-median failed/total ratio (ratio of failed com-
panies-bankruptcy and defunct-to all companies funded by this firm in all prior funds); dum-
my for above-median prior fundraising (based on total dollars raised by VC firm prior to this
fund); normalized total dollars raised prior to this fund; normalized sold/total and failed/total
ratios; venture firm age when this fund was raised. All regressions are OLS with venture-firm
random effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors. The t-statistics are reported
under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent
levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
NPV Management Fee over 11 Years
Dependent Variable Percentage Committed Capital







Lagged Fund Size, Normalized
Above-median Total Dollars Raised
Total Dollars Raised, Normalized
Sold/Total Companies Ratio
Failed/Total Companies Ratio
1.476 1.202 1.548 1.471 0.73
(1.82)* (1.4) (1.86* (2.16)** (0.88)
0.46 0.182 0.477 0.895 0.802
(0.30) (0.12) (0.31) (0.67) (0.52)
2.302 L763 2.296 2.305
(2.40)** (2.02)** (2.35)** (2.44)**
-0.942 -0.779 -0.938 -0.999











Fund Vintage Year 0.277 0.263 0.271 0.200 0.185(1.09) (0.99) (1.06) (0.92) (0.79)






-534.953 -508.464 -521.779 -380.11 -351.916
(1.05) (0.95) (1.02) (0.88) (0.75)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
66 66 66 66 66
28 28 28 28 28
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TABLE 6
Predictors of carry. The dependent variable is carry as a percent of fund's profits. Independent
variables are: normalized fund size; lagged normalized fund size; normalized fund number;
dummy for above-median sold/total ratio (ratio of sold companies-through IPO, acquisition,
merger, buyout-to all companies funded by this venture firm in all prior funds); dummy for
above-median failed/total ratio (ratio of failed companies-bankruptcy and defunct-to all
companies funded by this firm in all prior funds); dummy for above-median prior fundraising
(based on total dollars raised by VC firm prior to this fund); normalized total dollars raised prior
to this fund; normalized sold/total and failed/total ratios; venture firm age when this fund was
raised. All regressions are OLS with venture-firm random effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and
robust standard errors. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indi-
cate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent
level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
Dependent Variable Carried Interest, Percent 
Profits







Lagged Fund Size, Normalized
Above-median Total Dollars Raised




1.935 1.9 2.001 1.917 1.615
(2.39)** (1.91)* (2.17)** (2.24)** (1.72)*
2.866 2.868 2.889 2.81 2.45
(2.72)*** (266)*** (2.72)*** (2.56)** (1.98)**
1.571 1.571 1.592 1.588
(1.77)* (1.49) (1.77)* (1.83)*
-0.804 -0.785 -0.789 -0.79











-0.215 -0.22 -0.223 -0.206 -0.182
(1.20) (1.16) (1.23) (1.12) (0.82)
-. 285 -0.285 -0.282 -0.285 -0.256
Venture Firm Age When Fund Raised (O6* -09)5 (282 (O)* - .(2.46)** (2.39)** (2.36)** (2.39)** (1.80)*
454.124 462.581 469.82 435.346 387.792





Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
66 66 66 66 66
28 28 28 28 28




Ordinary least squares regressions for predictors of distribution rule. The dependent variable is
the distribution coefficient for cash distribution (ratio of expected carry under the distribution
rule specified in the partnership agreement over expected carry under the most pro-investor
distribution rule), for each fund in my sample. Independent variables are: normalized fund size;
lagged normalized fund size; normalized fund number; dummy for above- median sold/total ratio
(ratio of sold companies-through IPO, acquisition, merger, buyout-to all companies funded by
this venture firm in all prior funds); dummy for above-median failed/total ratio (ratio of failed
companies-bankruptcy and defunct-to all companies funded by this firm in all prior funds);
dummy for above-median prior fundraising (based on total dollars raised by VC firm prior to
this fund); normalized total dollars raised prior to this fund; normalized sold/total and failed/total
ratios; venture firm age when this fund was raised. All regressions use venture-firm random
effects and robust standard errors. The sample is limited to fully liquidated funds-funds raised
in 1997 and earlier. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level
or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.







Lagged Fund Size, Normalized
Above-median Total Dollars Raised









0.064 0.155 -0.466 0.234 0.346
(0.21) (0.27) (1.42) (0.66) (0.87)
-0.278 -0.273 -0.398 -0.117 -0.297
(0.70) (0.66) (1.34) (0.22) (0.62)
0.07 0.076 0.319 -0.059
(0.19) (0.21) (1.33) (0.14)
0.305 0.284 0.572 0.335












0.147 0.145 0.162 0.127 0.16
(2.80)*** (2.64)*** (4.32)*** (1.94)* (2.98)***
0.038 0.037 0.004 0.04 0.048
(1.26) (1.19) (0.19) (1.17) (1.49)
-291.416 -287.824 -321.519 -252.489 -316.818
(2.78)*** (2.62)*** (4.30)*** (1.92)* (2.96)***
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
26 26 26 26 26
12 12 12 12 12
Understanding Compensation Arrangements
Panel B
Ordered probit regressions for predictors of distribution rule for cash distributions. The depen-
dent variable equals 1 when the distribution rule is Escrow; 2 for Return First; 3 for Ceiling 125
percent; 4 for Ceiling 120 percent; 5 for Ceiling 115 percent; 6 for Ceiling 110 percent; 7 for 100
percent; 8 for Payback. Independent variables are the same as in Panel A. All regressions ven-
ture firm clusters. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate
significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level








Lagged Fund Size, Normalized
Above-median Total Dollars Raised
Total Dollars Raised, Normalized
Sold/Total Companies Ratio
Failed/Total Companies Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.005 0.209 -0.064 -0.134 -0.165
(0.02) (1.03) (0.28) (0.58) (0.72)
-0.124 -0.169 -0.154 -0.266 -0.242
(0.48) (0.64) (0.62) (1.06) (0.94)
0.287 0.271 0.294 0.369
(0.82) (0.81) (0.84) (1.07)
0.495 0.489 0.498 0.469











0.066 0.078 0.069 0.081 0.069(1.17) (1.37) (1.24) (1.49) (1.21)
0.028 0.033 0.027 0.028 0.031




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
66 66 66 66 66
28 28 28 28 28
Panel C
Summary of distribution arrangements in partnership agreements written by the same law firm
for different VC firms. The data set includes three law firms, each servicing three VC firms. Each
VC firm has multiple fund agreements written by that law firm. Each partnership agreement has
separate provisions for cash and securities distributions. Cash distribution provisions are re-
ported in the top line of each cell; securities distribution, in the bottom line.
First VC Firm Second VC Firm Third VC Frm
Law F'm A 100 percent ceiling Return capital first 100 percent ceiling
100 percent ceiling 125 percent ceiling Payback no interest
Law Firm B 125 percent ceiling 120 percent ceiling 120 percent ceiling
125 percent ceiling Payback no interest Payback no interest
Law Frm C 120 percent ceiling Return capital first 100 percent ceiling
Payback no interest Return capital first Payback no interest
20091
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TABLE 8
The dependent variable is the total VC compensation-NPV of carry payout under the distribu-
tion rule specified in the agreement, plus NPV of the management fee. All funds are assumed to
be $100M. Independent variables are: normalized fund size; lagged normalized fund size; norma-
lized fund number, dummy for above- median sold/total ratio (ratio of sold companies-through
IPO, acquisition, merger, buyout-to all companies funded by this venture firm in all prior
funds); dummy for above-median failed/total ratio (ratio of failed companies-bankruptcy and
defunct-to all companies funded by this firm in all prior funds); dummy for above-median prior
fundraising (based on total dollars raised by VC firm prior to this fund); normalized total dollars
raised prior to this fund; normalized sold/total and failed/total ratios; venture firm age when this
fund was raised. All regressions are OLS with vintage-year fixed effects, venture-firm random
effects, and robust standard errors. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at
10 percent level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.







Lagged Fund Size, Normalized
Above-median Total Dollars Raised




1.634 1.432 1.595 1.553 0.679
(1.66)* (1.25) (1.53) (1.62) (0.57)
0.283 0.137 -0.001 0.804 0.8
(0.14) (0.07) 0.00 (0.40) (0.38)
2.269 1.974 2.295 2.227
(1.92)* (1.54) (2.02)** (1.84)*
-L96 -1.855 -1.993 -1.97











1.06 1.046 1.112 0.972 0.865
(349)*** (3.8)*** (349)*** (3.14)*** (2.72)***






-2,070.15 -2,042.48 -2,173.75 -1,894.51 -1,682.70
(3.40)*** (3.20)*** (3.41)*** (3.o6)*** (2.64)***
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
66 66 66 66 66
28 28 28 28 28
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TABLE 9
Panel A
Predictors of fund size. The dependent variable is fund size, in millions of 2008 dollars. Independent
variables include: the size of the VC's previous fund; the cumulative size of all prior funds of that
VC; first dummy for above-median performance (based on ratio of sold companies (through IPO,
acquisitions, mergers, buyouts) to total companies funded by this firm in all prior funds); second
dummy for above-median performance funds (based on similar ratio of IPOs to total companies
funded); date of VC firm formation; and fund vintage year. The sample is as follows: in Columns (1)
through (4), all pre-1997 funds in VentureXpert database; in Column (5), funds #1 through #5 by
VCs who raised a total of more than five funds (that is, early funds by VCs who survived for a long
time); in Column (6), funds #1 through #5 for VCs who raised fewer than 5 funds; in Column (7),
funds #6 through #10 (late funds for long-lived VCs). All regressions are OLS with venture-firm
fixed effects, vintage-year fixed effects, venture-firm clusters, and robust standard errors The t-
statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in boldface for
variables of interest.
All VC All VC All VC All VC Funds 1-5 Funds 1-5if VC Has if VC Has Funds > 5Funds Funds Funds Funds >5Fns 5Fud
> 5 Funds < 5 Funds
Dependent Fund Size, $Million
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.31 0.137 0.155 0.312 0.458
Lag Fund Size (1.69)* (1.25) (1.21) (1.68)* (1.83)*
-0.059 -0.137
(0.15) (1.39)
Above-median 85.907 114.868 57.876 83.09 82.038 -15.57
Sold/Total (2.00)** (2.31)** (2.08)** (L97)** (2.03)** (0.44)
11.9
(0.21)
Above-median -101.078 -165.09 -93.479 -101.40 -131.51 21.699 -78.533














Venture-firm 8.683 11.049 1.198 7.972 6.51 0.572 14.983
Age When Fund
Raised (2.08)** (1.61) (0.23) (2.03)** (L72)* (0.18) (5.68)***
-17055.9 -21908.3 -2255.5 -15681.6 -12799.8 -1038.4 -29338.7
Constant (2.06)** (1.60) (0.22) (2.00)** (1.70)* (0.16) (5.62)***
Observations 41713 27682 41713 41713 23832
Venture-firm FE




550 550 174 376 36
0.53 0.45 0.53 0.36 0.62
Venture Firms 550 285
R-squared 0.45 0.59
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Panel B
Predictors of changes in fund size. The dependent variable is the change in fund size (size of fund
(N) minus size of an immediately preceding fund (N-I)), all in millions of 2008 dollars. Indepen-
dent variables include: total dollars raised before fund (N) minus total dollars raised before fund
(N-1); size of fund (N-i) minus size of fund (N-2); fund number; IPO/total ratio in fund (N)
minus IPO/total ratio in fund (N-1); sold/total ratio in fund N minus sold/total ratio in fund (N-I);
fund vintage year. The sample includes all pre-1997 stand-alone venture funds in VentureXpert
database. All regressions are OLS with venture-firm fixed effects, vintage-year fixed effects,
venture-firm clusters, and robust standard errors. The t -statistics are reported under regression
coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Signifi-
cant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
Dependent Variable (Size of Fund N) minus (Size of Fund N-I)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change: Size of Fund N-1 Minus Size -0.409 -0.36
of Fund N-2 (6.42)*** (4.31)***
Change: Total Dollars Raised before
Fund N Minus Same Before Fund N-I
Change: Sold/All Companies before









Change: Fail /All Companies before











0.155 0.125 -0.06 0.114 0.067
(1.47) (1.20) (0.55) (1.08) (0.68)
0.026 0.014 0.147 0.063 0.076
(0.62) (0.36) (3.73)*** (1.41) (1.85)*
-52.058 -28.231 -292.448 -126.328 -150.891
(0.63) (0.36) (3.74)*** (1.42) (1.86)*
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
22672 22672 35069 21854 21854
227 227 337 202 202




The dependent variable is NPV of management fee over eleven-year fund life, as a percent of commit-
ted capital. Independent variables are: dummies for each management fee rule; a dummy for whether
the fee formula changes in midstream of fund's existence; a dummy indicating whether the fee is
based only on committed capital; normalized total dollars raised by venture firm in all prior
funds; VC firm age in the year when fund is raised; normali-..d fund size; and normalized fund num-
ber. In Columns (1) through (3), the omitted category is Rule 9 (increasing percentage, then, declining
percentage, plus change in base from committed to managed capital). All regressions are OLS with
venture-firm random effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors. The t-statistics are
reported under regression coefficients *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in boklface for variables of interest
Dependent Variable
Rule 1 Dummy
(Constant Percent; Committed Capital)
Rule 2 Dummy






Portion of Committed Capital Base)
Rule 5 Dummy (Constant Percent;
Switch Base Committed to Managed)
Rule 6 Dummy (Increasing Percent;
Switch Base Committed to Managed)
Rule 7 Dummy (Declining Percent;
Switch Base Committed to Managed)
Rule 8 Dummy (Increasing Percent,
Declining Percent; Managed Capital)
Formula Changes in Midstream, Dummy
Base is Committed Capital, Dummy
Total Dollars Raised by VC in All
Prior Funds, Normalized










































11.494 11.931 10.78 15.693







Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
68 68 66 66 66
28 28 28 28 28
• o
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TABLE 11
Panel A
Ordered probit regressions estimating the degree of management fee manipulability. The depen-
dent variable takes value of 0 when management fee is based on committed capital; 1 if fee is
based on managed capital at least sometime during years 5 to 11; and 2 if fee is based on ma-
naged capital during years 5 to 11 and at least sometime during years 0 to 5. Independent va-
riables are: carry as a percent of profits; NPV of total management fee over 11-year fund life as a
percent of committed capital; total dollars raised by a VC in all prior funds; VC firm age in the
year when fund is raised; a dummy indicating whether the formula for fee calculation changes in
midstream of fund's existence; ratio of companies sold by the fund (through IPO, acquisition,
merger, buyout) to number of companies funded by fund; and ratio of fund's failed companies
(bankruptcy or defunct) to number of companies funded by fund. All regressions are ordered
probit with venture-firm fixed effects, vintage-year fixed effects, and robust standard errors. The
t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 per-
cent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in bold-
face for variables of interest.
"0" = management fee based on committed capital;
"1" = based on managed capital at least sometime
during years 5 to 11; "2" = based on managed capital at
least some time in years 0 through 5, plus years 5 to 11
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Total Dollars Raised by VC in All
Prior Funds, Normalized
Venture-firm Age When Fund Raised
Sold Companies/Total Companies
Before This Fund, Normalized
Failed Companies/Total Companies
Before This Fund, Normalized
Carry as Percent of Profits
Management Fee NPV As
Percent of Committed Capital
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Panel B
Logit regressions estimating the predictors of the use of classic management fee formula (con-
stant percent of committed capital). Dependent variable equals 1 when classic formula is used
and 0 otherwise. Independent variables are: fund vintage year; total dollars raised by a VC in all
prior funds; ratio of companies sold by the fund (through IPO, acquisition, merger, buyout) to
number of companies funded by fund; ratio of fund's failed companies (bankruptcy or defunct)
to number of companies funded by fund; and VC firm age in the year when fund is raised. All re-
gressions use venture-firm random effects, robust standard error. The t-statistics are reported under
regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.
Significant results (at 10 percent level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
"1" when management fee is flat percent of committed
Dependent Variable capital; "0" otherwise
(1) (2)
Vintage Year 0.775 0.994(2.23)** (2.52)**
Total Dollars Raised by VC in All 4.097 0.315
Prior Funds, Normalized (0.96) (0.10)
-0.038 -0.032
Venture-firm Age When Fund Raised
(0.20) (0.15)
Sold Companies/Total Companies in 
-24.956
Prior Funds, Normalized (1.28)
Failed Companies/Total Companies in 0.835
Prior Funds, Normalized (0.16)
Constant -1,562.95 -1,998.06
(2.24)** (2.53)**
Venture-firm Random Effects Yes Yes
Observations 68 66
Venture Firms 28 28
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TABLE 12
PanelA
Estimating income-smoothing within funds. Dependent variable is the ratio of the management
fee that a VC earns during the first five years of a fund's life over the fee during the entire fund's
life (eleven years). Management fee is measured as percent of committed capital. Independent
variables include: total dollars raised by the VC firm before this fund; fund vintage year; the
ratio of sold companies (IPO, acquisitions, mergers, buyouts) to number of companies funded by
this fund; the ratio of failed companies (bankruptcy and defunct) to number of companies
funded by this fund; carry as a percent of fund's profits; NPV of management fee over eleven
years, as a percent of fund's committed capital. All regressions use venture-firm random effects
and robust standard errors. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, ***
indicate significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 5 per-
cent level or better) are in boldface for variables of interest.
Dependent Variable
Total Dollars Raised by VC in
Total Dollars Raised by VC in
All Prior Funds, Normalized
Fund Vintage Year
Sold Companies/Total Companies in
Prior Funds, Normalized
Failed Companies/Total Companies in
Prior Funds, Normalized
Carry As Percent of Profits







Cumulative management fee during years 1 through 5
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Panel B
Logit regressions estimating income smoothing across funds. The dependent variable equals 1
when the fund's management fee peaks in middle years of fund's life and 0 otherwise. Indepen-
dent variables include: "fundraising cycle of 4-6 years" dummy, taking value of 1 when a VC firm
raises new funds each four to six years (on average) and 0 otherwise; net present value of man-
agement fee over eleven years as a percent of committed capital; fund vintage year; fund size; the
ratio of IPOs to number of companies funded by this fund; the ratio of failed companies (bank-
ruptcy and defunct) to number of companies funded by this fund; carry as a percent of fund's
profits; and total dollars raised by the VC firm before this fund. All regressions use venture firm
random effects and robust standard errors. The coefficient of interest is that on the "fundraising
cycle" dummy. The t-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. *, **, *** indicate signific-
ance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. Significant results (at 10 percent level or better)
are in boldface for variables of interest.
"1" when management fee peaks in midyears of
Dependent Variable fund's life; "0" otherwise
(1) (2) (3)
16.024 13.571 18.955
Fundraising Cycle of 4-6 Years Dummy 16.024 13.571 1.955(3.45)*** (2.26)** (2.73)***
Total Dollars Raised by VC in All 3.829 8.647 9.756
Prior Funds, Normalized (1.23) (2.16)** (2.16)**
Fund Vintage Year 1A39 127 2.624(2.70)*** (Li7)* (2.43)**
Carry As Percent of Profits -0.711 -1.175
(1.20) (1.76)*
Management Fee NPV As Percent of -1.551 -2.099
Committed Capital (2.48)** (3.00)***
Sold Companies/Total Companies in -30.286
Prior Funds, Normalized (1.67)*
Failed Companies/Total Companies in -0.264
Prior Funds, Normalized (0.03)
Constant -2,893.65 -3,630.53 -5,214.63Costnt(2.71)*** (1.87)* (2.42)**
Venture-firm Random Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 68 68 68
VC Firms 28 28 28
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APPENDIX
ASSUMED SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS FOR
MANAGEMENT FEE BASED ON MANAGED CAPITAL
To compute the NPV of management fees, I assume a 7 percent discount rate and an eleven-year
life for the fund. For funds that use a fee based on managed capital, I assume the schedule of in-
vestments and distributions set forth below. The schedule is the average for a 1992 fund.












Source: Sand Hill Econometrics.
